Research On The Development Strategy Of Chengdu-Europe Railway Express Based On Game Between Inland Port And Seaport

As an increasingly active mode of transportation in the international freight market,Chengdu-Europe Railway Express(CERE for short)has changed its development stage from high speed to high quality.At the same time,China is constantly promoting "the belt and road" and "western land sea new corridor of China".With the increasingly integrated development of shipping and rail transport,CERE has entered the new normal process of international "Railway and Shipping".To promote the joint development of coastal port and Chengdu International Railway Port(CIRP for short),which is the the departure station of CERE,has become an important new way to solve the problem of CERE.Therefore,based on the perspective of game theory,it is of great meaning to study the evolution relationship between inland port and seaport under the new normal development of CERE,analyze the dynamic process of competition and cooperation between the two ports and the influence of relevant factors,and put forward scientific and reasonable development strategies,in order to enhance the core competitiveness of CERE and promote its sustainable ecological development.Firstly,based on the development status of CERE,this paper clarifies its Benefits and drawbacks in the international freight market and the development problems it faces.Taking the new trend of international "Rail + shipping" as the development background,this paper puts forward a new development idea for CERE.Secondly,it combs the related subjects between CERE and international shipping,clarifies the necessity of joint development between CIRP and coastal ports,and analyzes the main motivation of competition and cooperation between the two ports.Based on this,this paper constructs an evaluation model of "supply and demand" coupling relationship between the two ports based on entropy weight method,and makes a preliminary static analysis and evaluation of the competition and cooperation relationship between CIRP and coastal ports in Shanghai,Shenzhen,Tianjin,Xiamen,Qinzhou and other places.It is found that nearly half of the coastal ports and CIRP are in a moderate or even low coupling state,and then the problems and reasons between the two ports are analyzed.Thirdly,based on the actual coupling relationship and existing problems between CIRP and seaport,this paper analyzes the dynamic development process of the competition and cooperation relationship between the two ports.The game mechanism and revenue function among government,inland port and seaport are clarified,and the evolutionary game model based on the competition and cooperation between inland port and seaport,and the evolutionary game model of government,inland port and seaport are constructed respectively.And from different development situations,the ESS and evolutionary path are analyzed in depth.Finally,combined with the actual situation of CIRP and coastal port under the new normal of CERE,the evolutionary game process between the two ports and the multiagent evolutionary game process considering the role of government intervention are simulated by using numerical simulation analysis method.In order to find out the main influencing factors of the evolutionary game,the parameters of the evolutionary game model are adjusted individually or in combination.Then,based on the evaluation results of the coupling relationship between the two ports,from the different perspectives of good coupling,moderate coupling and low coupling,this paper makes an in-depth study on the stability strategy between the two ports,so as to explore the optimal promotion ways and strategies for the government and the two ports to maximize the benefits of the cooperation between the two ports,and finally puts forward the development countermeasures and suggestions for the new normal of CERE.