Provision Strategy Analysis Of Network Video Platform In The Presence Of Social Influence

Network video is one of the most widely used information products in our daily life.People use it for entertainment and working every day.With the development of information technology and network economy,the dependence of network video on social influence is increasingly prominent,and social influence which largely increases the dissemination efficiency of network videos,plays more and more important role in the operation and management of network video platforms.How social influence can be used efficiently to maximize the platforms' revenue and improve operational efficiency,has been a universal concern for the network video platform.Considering that the drama is one of the most favorite network videos among consumers and network video platforms act as providers of the dramas,this paper puts forward the research of network video platform's choices of the drama's provision strategies in the presence of social influence.With the consideration of the impact of social influence on consumers' utility and the market demand,the network video provision strategies are investigated respectively under a monopoly market,an inter-temporal situation,a duopoly market with competition and cooperation by using the principle and methods of game theory,so as to provide some insights for the platforms' operations on network videos.Firstly,we take the analysis of choices of provision strategy in a monopoly market as the basic model and investigate the optimal choice of the network video platform.Research has shown that social influence has an impact on the choice of provision strategies of the network video platform.A trial strategy is the worst choice for the network video platform in the presence of no social influence.In the presence of social influence,however,the platform can always profit from a trial strategy.When the degree of social influence is large and the extent to consumers dislike advertising is small,the network video platform prefers a free strategy,on the contrary,paid strategy is optimal.Social influence plays different role under three strategies.When the platform adopts a free strategy and a paid strategy,the market demand increases with social influence.When the platform adopts a trial strategy,social influence boosts the demand of watching free trial clips and decreases the demand of subscribing the video without a trial.Social influence expands the area where consumers tolerate advertising.Secondly,the paper makes an analysis about the inter-temporal provision strategies of network video platform based on the characteristics of the two-stage broadcast cycle of network videos.Research has shown that the choice of strategy depends on the change of consumers' preference,the trial time and the degree of social influence.When consumers are offered a long-time free trial,platform's decision relay more on the degree of consumers' preference,and social influence has less effect on provision strategy of network video platform.When consumers are offered a short-time free trial and consumers' preference for the video drama is reduced in the second stage,a free-to-paid strategy is a poor choice.If the degree of social influence is large,a free-to-trial strategy is the optimal choice,on the contrary,a freeto-free strategy is optimal.When consumers' preference for the network video drama is increased,a free-to-free strategy is a poor choice.If the degree of social influence is large,a free-to-trial strategy is the optimal choice.On the contrary,a free-to-paid strategy is optimal for the platform.Social influence will always increase the market demand under a free-to-free strategy and a free-to-paid strategy,while the consumers who subscribe the video without a trial are decreased and the demand of watching the trial clips are increased under a free-totrial strategy.Thirdly,the paper makes a further research of the provision strategy choice for two network video platforms in a period under a duopoly market.Research has shown that regardless of the impact of trial clips on preference,both platforms adopting a free strategy is an only equilibrium in the presence of no social influence..In the presence of social influence,however,the game equilibrium changes with the difference of the quality,the impact of trial clips on preference and social influence.If the difference of the quality is relatively small,the degree of social influence and the impact of trial clips on preference is large,only high-quality platform is willing to offer free trial clips.Otherwise,both platforms adopt a free strategy.If the difference of the quality is relatively large,both platforms prefer a free strategy.Regardless of the degree of social influence,both platforms can realize the Pareto improvement by adopting a trial strategy.The impact of social influence on the market demand of the two platforms are different under different strategies.Only when high-quality platforms provide trial clips and the difference of the quality is small,social influence will decrease the market demand of not subscribing the video after a trial of high-quality platform and increase the demand for free video viewing in low-quality platform.Otherwise,results are just the opposite.Finally,based on the current situation of the network video industry,that is,more and more platforms take participate in making self-made dramas.We make an analysis about the broadcast strategy choice of the self-made drama in the presence of competition and social influence.Research has shown that only when the degree of competition is small,the video owner platform can benefit from a simulcast strategy in the presence of no social influence.Regardless of the degree of competition between two platforms,however,it is probable to achieve cooperation by adopting a simulcast strategy in the presence of social influence.Specifically,a simulcast strategy is optimal for the two platforms when the degree of competition is small.When the degree of competition is relatively large and social influence is small,an exclusive broadcast is the optimal strategy for the video owner platform.On the contrary,when the degree of competition and social influence are relatively large,the video owner platform is willing to adopt a simulcast strategy because the revenue is large enough to compensate the revenue loss from competition.The platform is more likely to adopt a simulcast strategy in the presence of social influence than that of no social influence,and they are even willing to share their self-made dramas to competitors for free because of a larger demand generated from social influence and the cooperation.Furthermore,social influence has an inhibitory impact on an exclusive broadcast strategy.