Research On Pricing Of Dual Channel Supply Chain Considering Credit Service Under Different Power Structure

The rapid development of the Internet and information technology has made online platform shopping gradually popular,and more and more manufacturers are opening additional online channels to achieve a seamless integration of online and offline.In addition,in recent years,in the general environment of the new crown epidemic,consumers’ personal disposable income has been decreasing,and the consumer market has become less active,so in the competitive supply chain,companies are increasingly using trade credit to attract customers,which on the one hand can relieve consumers’ economic pressure,and on the other hand can stimulate the consumer market and expand market share.Therefore,it is of great significance to explore the influence of credit service factors on the decision-making of supply chain members when studying the dual-channel supply chain.This thesis constructs a model of a manufacturer dual-channel supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer who opens online channel and a single retailer,and investigates the impact of credit services on pricing decisions of dual-channel supply chain members under different power structures.First,the manufacturer-dominated and retailer-dominated Stackelberg game and the Nash game model with power equilibrium between manufacturer and retailer are constructed,respectively,to analyze and compare the optimal pricing decisions,the optimal demand and profit levels of dual-channel supply chain members under different power structures;then we construct and analyze the optimal pricing model for dual-channel supply chain members with different power structures when online and offline credit services are considered separately;finally,the impact of credit services on pricing decisions of dual-channel supply chain members under different power structures is compared and discussed,and the impact of channel preferences and credit services on pricing decisions is explored.The results shows that:(1)the same online price decision when there are no credit services under different power structures,and the offline price when in a dominant position is equal to the price at power equilibrium,while being greater than the price at an inferior position;while the wholesale price is higher than the wholesale price in power equilibrium and in an inferior(2)When supply chain members provide credit services to consumers,the price decisions of the lower line of different power structures are the same,and when the dominant supply chain member provides credit services,the price of the supply chain member of the channel is higher than that of the power equilibrium and inferior position,and compared with no credit service,demand and profit are increased.(3)With the increase of offline channel preference,offline demand will increase,while online demand will first decrease and then increase.