Research Of Dual-channel Supply Chain Decision Making Considering Delivery Time Under Different Power Structures

With the fast improvement of the e-commerce industry,the needs of consumers in the market also tend to diversify and complex evolutionary trends.For satisfy the needs of different types of consumers,many companies have opened online sales channels and implemented a dual-channel marketing model that combines online and offline.At the same time,with more and more homogeneous products in the market,consumers’ requirements for products and services are becoming more and more stringent.In addition to the demand for good quality and low price,the demand for online products’ delivery time is also getting higher and higher,so the delivery time of products has become a key factor for customers’ choice of consumption channels,which is very important for establishing the loyalty of online channel consumers.Therefore,when studying dual-channel supply chains,it is meaningful to explore the influence of factors related to the delivery time of online channels on the decision making of supply chain members.Due to the increasing diversification of sales channels and product types in the market,the competition between members of the supply chain has become more intense,and there are certain differences in the power positions of supply chain members of different sizes in the supply chain.In this thesis,we study the dual-channel supply chain decision problem considering delivery time for a manufacturer’s dual-channel supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer,taking into account the current actual situation.First,three models with three power structures,the manufacturer-dominated Stackelberg game,the retailerdominated Stackelberg game,and the manufacturer-retailer power equilibrium Nash game,are constructed to analyze the optimal price decisions of the supply chain members in different situations and calculate the optimal profits of the supply chain members as well as the optimal profits of the whole supply chain.Then,a two-part pricing contract is established to coordinate the supply chain under the three scenarios.Finally,the relationship between the equilibrium values of the parameters under different power structures is compared by numerical simulation,and the effects of consumers’ online channel preference coefficients and delivery time sensitivity coefficients on the decisions of the supply chain members are analyzed.The results show that:(1)Under the three power structures,consumers’ preference for online channels and customers’ sensitivity to product delivery time affect the optimal decision of the supply chain,and the optimal delivery time of manufacturers’ online channels differs under different power structures,with the optimal delivery time gradually shortening as the manufacturers’ power decreases.(2)The optimal profit of the dominant supply chain member is higher than the optimal profit of that member in the other two cases,and the total profit of the supply chain is optimal in the Nash game with power equilibrium between the manufacturer and the retailer.(3)Under all three power structures,a reasonable two-part pricing contract enables supply chain coordination,and the one-time fixed fee paid by the retailer to the manufacturer in the two-part pricing contract decreases as the retailer’s power in the supply chain increases.