| Since the reform and opening up over 40 years ago,opening up to the outside w orld has always been an important foundation for China to achieve economic growth,and it is also an inevitable choice for the future economy to achieve higher levels of leapfrog development.The opening up of the capital market,as an important field for China to adhere to comprehensive opening-up,enables the free flow of domestic and foreign capital,which plays a positive role in improving resource allocation and pro moting the stable development of China’s capital market.The introduction of a large number of mature overseas investors can improve the current market information env ironment,achieve value investment,and enable the capital market to provide good se rvices and impetus for the development of the micro real economy.The opening up o f the capital market can effectively supervise the daily operations and decision-makin g of corporate executives,improve the information asymmetry between the board of directors and management,and enterprises will also actively engage in internal gover nance to improve their information environment and gain the favor of investors.As t he core of a company,changes in management often accompany strategic changes an d internal structural adjustments,conveying signals of positive governance to the out side world.Therefore,in the context of the "Shanghai Hong Kong Stock Connect" po licy,it is of great theoretical and practical significance to delve into how capital mark et openness affects executive change.Based on the quasi natural experimental background of the "Shanghai Hong Ko ng Stock Connect" policy,this article selects data from listed companies in China fro m 2010 to 2020 for empirical testing,and obtains the following research conclusions:Firstly,the impact of capital market openness on executive turnover.This article use s propensity score matching and double difference model for empirical testing and fi nds that after the implementation of the "Shanghai Hong Kong Stock Connect" polic y,the probability of executive change in target enterprises is significantly higher than that of non-standard enterprises.This indicates that the opening of the capital market can significantly increase the probability of executive change.And product market c ompetition has played a moderating role in this process.The more intense the compet ition in the product market,the more significant the increase in the probability of exe cutives changing due to the opening of the capital market.Secondly,through the imp act mechanism test,it is believed that after the implementation of the "Shanghai Hon g Kong Stock Connect" policy,the increase in investor sentiment,the easing of finan cing constraints,and the increase in institutional investor shareholding ratio can all pr omote the probability of corporate executives changing.Thirdly,after grouping accor ding to the nature of property rights,degree of marketization,and degree of equity ch ecks and balances,compared to listed companies with low marketization and equity c hecks and balances in state-owned and regional markets,the probability of executive changes in private and regional listed companies with high marketization and equity checks and balances is more significantly affected by the opening of the capital mark et.Fourthly,after a series of robustness tests,such as parallel trend test,placebo test,Heckman two-stage model test,and replacement of PSM matching method,the concl usions remain unchanged,which once again proves the reliability of the research con clusions.This article combines empirical testing and case analysis to detail the gover nance effects and impact paths of capital market openness on internal enterprises.It e nriches the research on the impact of capital market openness on micro enterprise lev el,and provides empirical reference for guiding enterprises to actively improve their own governance level,deepen China’s financial market system reform,and subseque nt relevant policy and institutional arrangements and adjustments. |
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