Research On Transport Service Outsourcing Strategies And Coordination In Fresh Cold Chain With Different Freshness Targets

In recent years,with the support of government policies,the shortcomings of insufficient public cold chain logistics facilities and incomplete networks in China have been greatly improved,and the standards for cold chain logistics operations have also been continuously improved.However,the phenomenon of supply and demand mismatch and "chain interruption" in the cold chain is still prominent.In order to enhance the freshness motivation of cold chain service providers and improve the efficiency of the entire process of cold chain transportation,this article takes the freshness level of the front and back half of the cold chain transportation as the research object.Based on the two freshness goals of the integrator,which allow for certain differences in freshness between the front and back half of the transportation and have the same rigidity requirement for freshness,this article studies the outsourcing strategy of the integrator’s cold chain transportation services and its coordination mechanism with the front and back half of the transportation carriers,It has important theoretical significance and application value for preventing cold chain "breakage" and improving the freshness of agricultural products throughout the cold chain.Consider a cold chain transportation service supply chain consisting of one integrator and two carriers.Firstly,assuming that the integrator allows for differences in freshness in the first and second half of the journey,a master-slave game is constructed between the integrator and two heterogeneous carriers.A linear incentive mechanism for freshness level is established,and the optimal freshness level and optimal shipping cost before and after the incentive are compared.The impact of incentive intensity on the optimal result is mainly analyzed.Finally,the effectiveness of the mixed incentive mechanism is further verified through numerical analysis.Secondly,the consistency of freshness in the first half of the journey and the second half of the journey is set for the rigid requirements of integrators.The Decision model of integrators and carriers under the two outsourcing strategies of general contracting and subcontracting is constructed.The optimal freshness level and carrier price are solved by using sequential games,and the impact of cost sharing coefficient and freshness preservation cost coefficient on the optimal decision-making is specifically analyzed.Finally,compare and analyze the relatively optimal outsourcing strategies under different freshness objectives.The research results indicate that:(1)when there is a difference in allowable freshness,the constructed carrier fee incentive strategy related to freshness level not only achieves an increase in the freshness level of carriers in the first and second half of the journey,reduces their freshness differences,but also improves the total profits of carriers and integrators in the first half of the journey.After numerical analysis,it has been verified that the profit of the second half carrier decreases after participating in incentives.Therefore,the integrator needs to transfer a portion of the profit to enhance the willingness of the second half carrier to maintain a higher freshness level,thereby achieving Pareto improvement of the supply chain.(2)When the rigidity requirement for freshness level is consistent,and the preservation cost coefficient of the current half way carrier is higher than that of the later half way carrier,the integrator will choose the general contracting strategy,and vice versa,choose the subcontracting strategy.Regardless of the outsourcing strategy,there is a choice conflict between the integrator and one of the carriers.Data analysis research shows that the cost of cold chain preservation accounts for a large proportion of the total cost of carriers,while cost sharing contracts can only achieve partial coordination among supply chain members.