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Research On The Evolution Of Personalization-privacy Dilemma And Its Co-regulation

Posted on:2023-06-17Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:G M PanFull Text:PDF
GTID:2569307118489444Subject:Applied Economics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Personalized marketing is a strategy widely adopted by enterprises,and its implementation needs to collect and use a large amount of personal information.Consumers have a dilemma about personalized services.Personalized marketing provides convenience and new experience,but may also cause privacy security issues,such as the phenomenon of "App eavesdropping".For enterprises,personalized marketing reduces advertising costs,but it often arouses consumers’ privacy concerns and generates resistance,which is not conducive to marketing promotion.Consumers and enterprises are trapped in the "personalization-privacy dilemma".Privacy concerns have become the main obstacle of personalized marketing,and how to balance marketing effects and personal privacy has become an important challenge.In this context,the integration of empirical analysis,evolutionary game theory and mutation theory to study the personalization-privacy problem can provide ideas for solving the privacy problem in personalized marketing and provide support for the optimization of regulatory policies.This paper uses an empirical relationship-driven stochastic evolutionary game model to solve the personalization-privacy problem.Firstly,the interaction behavior of individual decision in personalization-privacy dilemma is discussed through scenario simulation experiment,and the empirical relationship is mapped into the game relationship and strategy space in the game model.Considering the influence of random interference,Ito stochastic dynamics equation containing white noise was established,personalized and privacy dilemma stochastic dynamics model was constructed,and the limit conditions of exponential stability of tripartite zero moment solution were obtained.Finally,the effects of product revenue parameters and regulatory measures on system stability are simulated.On this basis,the paper focuses on the key role of regulation in solving the personalization-privacy dilemma,introduces the theory of mutation,and constructs the random tip mutation model of cooperative regulation in personalization-privacy dilemma.The stochastic dynamics equation is transformed into a mutation model with the limit probability density,which is used to describe the mutation phenomenon of cooperative regulation.The influence of excess returns,punishment intensity and privacy concern level on the effect of collaborative supervision is deeply discussed.The results show that :(1)information sensitivity and trust level have a significant interaction effect on consumers’ purchase intention.(2)The level of privacy concern affects the strategic choice of marketing enterprises and consumers.The individualprivacy dilemma under high privacy concerns is difficult to be broken by improving personalized benefits.Personalisation benefits can only work if privacy concerns are reduced enough.(3)With high privacy concerns,regulators can strengthen supervision,enhance consumer trust,and break the individual-privacy dilemma.(4)From the perspective of regulatory incentives,the intensity of punishment needs to cooperate with the probability of supervision,which has a significant impact on the behavioral decisions of regulatory subjects.(5)Higher levels of privacy concerns and reputation losses promote collaborative supervision.Therefore,this paper puts forward some effective suggestions to solve the personalization-privacy dilemma.From the perspective of collaborative supervision,it is suggested that the willingness of collaborative supervision should be evaluated timely and the intensity of punishment should be adjusted.Consumers are encouraged to play a supervisory role in privacy standards and improve the effect of collaborative supervision.
Keywords/Search Tags:Personalization-privacy Dilemma, Evolutionary Game Theory, Catastrophe Theory, Collaborative Regulation
PDF Full Text Request
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