Research On Supply Chain Contract Design Under Uncertain Market Environment

Against the background of technological progress and rapid economic development,companies are facing fierce competition while gaining more and more market opportunities.In the market,all kinds of products are updated rapidly and consumers’ demands are diversified and personalized,all of which require companies to give feedback quickly.In these changes,companies gradually realize the importance of supply chain management,and companies are no longer in competition with each other,but in the form of supply chains formed by companies working together to compete among themselves.However,since the participating enterprises in the supply chain are different economic agents,each enterprise tends to focus only on its own interests,while being indifferent to the interests of the whole supply chain,and in such an environment,the phenomenon of incompatibility with the objectives of the whole supply chain system will arise.On this basis,supply chain coordination can effectively solve this problem,and at the same time,the supply chain contract mechanism can also effectively coordinate the problems in the supply chain.By signing a contract,each enterprise in the supply chain stipulates the behavior of member enterprises,which will lead the participating enterprises to enhance their advantages and create optimal expected profits,and realize the coordination of the whole supply chain system.In view of this,this paper studies the optimal contract design of supply chains based on demand uncertainty environment.First,the problem of optimal contract design for a supply chain with uncertain demand in a stochastic environment is investigated.Consider a supply chain system consisting of a retailer and two manufacturers providing substitutable products.On the one hand,the demand environment is uncertain when the retailer and the manufacturer enter into a contract;on the other hand,the forecast of consumer demand may not match the actual demand,and these two aspects lead to uncertainty in demand.Based on this,the demand model and the optimal profit model are established for retailers who choose to sell only one product and two products,respectively.By constructing the Stackelberg game model with the manufacturer as the leader and the retailer as the follower,the optimal price of the retailer and the corresponding optimal demand are portrayed,and then the optimal decision of the participating companies is obtained.Numerical simulations are used to analyze the impact on the optimal profit of retailers and manufacturers in a stochastic environment.Second,the optimal contract design of the supply chain with uncertain demand based on uncertainty theory is investigated.A two-level supply chain system is considered,whose basic process is that the manufacturer produces products at a unit cost price and takes the form of wholesaling the products to retailers at wholesale prices,who eventually sell them to consumers.After the sales season,if there is still a surplus of products ordered by the retailer,the manufacturer will buy back the surplus products at the buy-back price.Based on the newsboy model,the expected profit of the supply chain under the centralized decision,the expected profit of the manufacturer and the retailer under the decentralized decision and the consideration of the repurchase contract are constructed and analyzed by numerical simulation to compare the supply chain coordination achieved without and with the repurchase contract.The analysis shows that considering repurchase contracts can increase the expected profits of manufacturers and retailers when the repurchase price set by manufacturers is within a certain range;meanwhile,retailers increase their orders for products when considering repurchase contracts compared to the decentralized decision model.Supply chain coordination is achieved when the supply chain expected profit when considering repurchase contracts is equal to the supply chain expected profit under centralized decision making.This paper explores the optimal contracts offered by manufacturers in these two cases by comparing the optimal contract design for supply chains with demand uncertainty under stochastic environment and uncertainty-based theory,respectively,and the results show that different contracts need to be tailored to meet the optimal profits of each subject firm in the supply chain under different circumstances.This paper is both a continuation of existing research and a reference for decision making for manufacturers and retailers,with certain theoretical value and practical significance.