Research On The Impact Of Non-state-owned Enterprise Stock Repurchase On R&D Investmen

Stock buybacks are one of the tools of corporate governance,since the act of purchasing one’s own shares by a listed company releases a "good" news,which makes the share price of the company with buybacks increase to a certain extent and also regulates the financial leverage of the company to a certain extent,etc.The absence of a defined period and fixed amount,coupled with the enactment of the 2018 amendments to our commercial code,has led more companies in recent years to carry out share buybacks to govern their companies.However,the longevity of a company cannot be achieved without technological progress and innovation,and products and companies that do not have core competencies or are resting on their laurels and not moving forward are bound to be eliminated from the market.Therefore,companies should pay attention to and invest in necessary research and development projects.According to the principal-agent theory,we know that the inconsistency between senior management and shareholders’ interests is the root cause of rent-seeking by executives,which damages shareholders’ interests and affects corporate value.Skinner’s reinforcement theory explains that incentives and punishments can modify human behavior.Therefore,we believe that effective compensation and equity incentives for executives of listed companies can reduce their rent-seeking behavior to a certain extent.However,due to the characteristic economic market system in China,the nature of the enterprise has a fundamental influence on the incentive effect,so the nature of property rights in the research sample of this paper is limited to nonstate enterprises.Therefore,the impact of stock repurchase on R&D investment in non-state enterprises and the path of this impact,and how executive compensation and equity incentives regulate the relationship between stock repurchase and R&D investment are the questions studied in this paper.Firstly,the research hypotheses are based on the domestic and international literature related to stock repurchase,R&D investment and executive incentives,the signaling theory,principal-agent theory and management incentive theory in the theory of stock repurchase and executive incentives,and the current situation of China based on the amendment of the law related to stock repurchase and the comprehensive consideration of the impact of the nature of property rights on the development of China’s enterprises.Secondly,A-share listed companies with non-state property rights nature in China from 2015-2019 are selected as samples,9684 sets of data are screened,stock repurchases are used as explanatory variables,R&D investment is used as the explanatory variable,stock mispricing,executive compensation level and executive shareholding ratio are introduced to construct an empirical model,and Stata software is used to conduct descriptive analysis,correlation analysis Stata software was used to conduct descriptive analysis,correlation analysis,regression results analysis and robustness test.The paper finally concludes that(1)stock buybacks by non-SOEs promote R&D investment in the following year through the path of investment catering behavior;(2)executive compensation incentives of non-SOEs positively moderate the firm’s investment catering behavior;and(3)executive equity incentives of non-SOEs negatively moderate the firm’s investment catering behavior.