Research On The Influence Of Executive Incentive On Inefficient Investment

In the modern enterprise management system,due to the separation of ownership and management rights,thus forming a principal-agent relationship.According to the principal-agent theory and the information asymmetry theory,there is a conflict of interest between the manager and the owner.Owners have the right to control the profits and profits of the enterprise,and the manager has the investment decision-making power.In the process of investment decision-making,in order to increase personal income,strengthen the control of corporate capital,may choose the net present value of negative investment projects,resulting in over-investment problems;may also reduce private costs,to avoid risk and give up the net The current value of the investment projects and lead to insufficient investment.These two kinds of non-normal investment problems are inefficient investment behavior.Scholars generally believe that through the managers and the interests of the owner of the agreement between the owners and managers to resolve the principal-agent conflict between the suppression of inefficient investment behavior.Specifically,we need to understand the work attitude of senior executives,work ability,and then develop effective incentives to influence the investment behavior of executives,thereby enhancing their investment efficiency.Recent studies on the suppression of inefficient investment in foreign academia focus on the impact of executive incentives on inefficient investment,such as the use of monetary incentives or equity incentives and other single incentive model for the impact of inefficient investment,the lack of comprehensive research.Compared with foreign countries,China's executive pay began to disclose in 1998,equity incentive system is also officially launched in 2006,so our research on inefficient investment started late,the theoretical system is not yet mature.In addition,there is little research on the impact of executive incentive models on inefficient investment.To this end,this paper takes the listed companies in China as the research object,through the empirical analysis of Chinese enterprises to implement the executive incentive system on the impact of inefficient investment,and compare the monetary incentive and equity incentive incentive model of these two inefficient investment.The degree of influence,and then come to the conclusion of this paper.This paper is based on the literature review of "literature review-theoretical analysis-empirical analysis-proposed".First of all,the relevant literature at home and abroad to sort out;Then we use the method of normative analysis to explain the theory of principal-agent theory,information asymmetry theory,risk-bearing theory,incomplete contract theory and incentive theory;Then,under the background of the executive incentive system in our country,we put forward the research hypothesis and establish the model according to the previous research and theoretical basis.Then,through the sample screening(4048 effective observations of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2012 to 2015)The samples were analyzed by SPSS statistical software for multiple linear regression,and the empirical results were obtained.Finally,the conclusions are drawn from the empirical results.The resultsshow that executive monetary compensation incentives and equity incentives can inhibit the production of inefficient investment behavior,but by comparing the extent of the impact of the two inefficient investment found that China's listed companies in the use of monetary compensation incentives than the use of equity incentives The role of greater.Finally,according to the existing problems of listed companies in China,the corresponding policy suggestions are put forward from the aspects of the perfection mechanism and the construction of supervision policy.