Research On The Impact Of Large Shareholders’ Equity Structure On The Design Of Performance-based Equity Incentive Scheme

Compared with European and American countries,the equity incentive system has a short development time in China.However,from the perspective of the number of implementation,the number of equity incentive schemes launched by listed companies shows a trend of rapid growth.The number of incentive schemes has increased from 14 in 2006 to 1,439 in 2018.Among the equity incentive scheme,the performance of equity incentive is one of the most common pattern,China’s first performance is a type of equity incentive model,are different from those of traditional line ever time the natural right of equity incentive mode,line type performance of equity incentive has power performance condition assessment and line power scheduling double limit.As a long-term incentive mechanism,equity incentive plays an important role in solving the principal-agent problem in China,"locking" the demand of enterprises for human capital,and realizing the long-term development goals of enterprises.However,as an imported equity incentive system in China’s implementation process problems are also emerging in an endless stream.Many scholars have found that the unreasonable design of equity incentive scheme and the lack of restrictions make it become a"golden handcuff" with both incentive and constraint functions.Its scheme design will have a direct impact on the equity incentive effect.At present,the concentration of equity structure in China is relatively prominent,and the performance-based equity incentive plan,as an institutional arrangement to stimulate and constrain the management,is deeply influenced by the major shareholders in its design,grant and implementation.At present,most of the researches on performance-based equity incentive schemes focus on their implementation effect and internal and external environment,but few on how to design equity incentive schemes effectively.Therefore,from the perspective of setting equity incentive exercise scheme,this paper explores whether and how the design of performance-based equity incentive exercise scheme is affected by different types of equity structure of major shareholders by subdividing the equity structure of major shareholders into single controlling major shareholders,single non-controlling major shareholders and multiple major shareholders.In the research,this paper reviews the literature on major shareholders and equity incentive schemes,and on the basis of principal-agent theory and pecking order theory of ownership structure,puts forward the theoretical analysis framework of major shareholders’ ownership structure,exercise time arrangement and exercise performance condition design respectively.On this basis,based on the Shanghai and shenzhen A shares in 2009-2018 the implementation of equity incentive plan of all listed companies as the research sample,the mean differences between group test,based on no correlation regression model of the coefficient difference test,based on the big shareholders using multiple linear regression model,the empirical analysis of different equity structure types of performance influence mechanism of equity incentive plan design.Through the research,the conclusion of this paper is as follows:first,the single controlling shareholder tends to set the longest exercise schedule;Second,several major shareholders tend to set a long exercise schedule;Third,single non-controlling major shareholder tends to set the shortest exercise schedule.In terms of the design of exercise performance conditions,first,single controlling shareholder tends to design the most stringent exercise performance conditions;Second,many major shareholders tend to design more stringent performance conditions of exercise;Third,single non-controlling shareholders tend to design the most relaxed performance conditions of exercise.From the perspective of exercise scheme design,this paper links the current situation of corporate governance environment in China with the scheme design,which not only enrichers the literature related to the shareholding structure of major shareholders,but also expands the research field of performance-based equity incentive scheme design.Secondly,from the perspective of exercise scheme design,the pecking order theory of ownership structure is verified,and the economic consequences of pecking order theory of ownership structure are supplemented and improved.