| As a financing method,equity pledge has developed rapidly in China’s capital market due to its advantages of less restrictive conditions,simple transaction procedures,and no transfer of control rights of listed companies,providing new financing channels for listed companies,and alleviating the financing difficulties of listed companies to a certain extent.However,the advantages and disadvantages go hand in hand.Under the background of imperfect capital market supervision system and widespread information asymmetry,with the increasing proportion and frequency of equity pledge by controlling shareholders,it will inevitably have a negative impact on enterprises.First of all,after the pledge of controlling shareholders’ equity,there is a risk of encroaching on the interests of small and medium-sized shareholders and even hollowing out the listed company.Secondly,during the pledge period,if the company’s share price continues to fall,it will cause the risk of control transfer,which will have a serious negative impact on the improvement of enterprise value.The characteristics of the ownership structure of China’s A-share listed companies with "one-share dominance" are widespread.On the one hand,for listed companies with relatively concentrated equity,if the controlling shareholders’ control rights and cash flow rights deviate during the equity pledge period,and the degree of deviation becomes larger,it will have a negative impact on the large shareholders’ positive promotion of the company value,and strengthen the motivation to infringe the interests of small and medium-sized shareholders.On the other hand,the controlling shareholders will not easily give up their control over the company.In order to avoid the transfer of control,the controlling shareholders will use their own rights to take effective measures to intervene in the company’s share price,resulting in problems such as the decline in the quality of information disclosure and the increase in the degree of information asymmetry,thus deepening the company’s own financing constraints,and finally adversely affecting the company’s value.This thesis combs and analyzes the previous research results,and analyzes and assumes the relationship between the equity pledge of controlling shareholders,financing constraints and enterprise value in combination with relevant concepts and theories.Subsequently,the data of listed companies in China from 2016 to 2021 were selected as the research sample for empirical analysis.At the same time,the step-wise test method was used to verify the intermediary role of financing constraints in the process of controlling shareholders’ equity pledge affecting corporate value.The main conclusions are as follows:(1)When other conditions are fixed,the proportion of equity pledge of controlling shareholders is negatively related to the enterprise value.(2)Under certain other conditions,the proportion of equity pledge is significantly positively correlated with financing constraints.(3)In the process of controlling shareholders’ equity affecting enterprise value,financing constraints play a part of intermediary role.(4)Further research found that compared with state-owned companies,the proportion of equity pledge in non-state-owned companies has a more significant negative correlation with enterprise value.In the robustness testing stage,the above conclusions are verified to be still valid by replacing the explained variables and replacing the sample data.In response,the following suggestions are proposed:(1)Improve the regulatory system and institutional regulations related to equity pledge business,especially the information disclosure system,and improve the transparency of accounting information.(2)Actively expand financing channels for listed companies in China,improve financing efficiency,and promote the positive development of enterprises.(3)Listed companies should establish a more sound supervision mechanism to restrict the behavior of controlling shareholders and further safeguard corporate interests. |
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