| Due to its low cost,strong flexibility and no change of control,equity pledge has gradually become an important financing tool for major shareholders to revitalize assets and obtain funds.However,while equity pledge alleviates financing constraints,it also generates corresponding risks.In 2018,the earnings ratio of the A stock market continued to decline,and the equity pledge risk of private listed companies continued to be exposed and spread,forming a group financing dilemma.In order to prevent systemic financial risks and maintain the stability of the capital market,General Secretary Xi Jinping clearly pointed out at the private enterprise symposium that it is necessary to actively resolve the equity pledge risks faced by private enterprises.In the context of improving the socialist market economy system with Chinese characteristics,China actively promotes the reform of mixed ownership and encourages cross-shareholding between state-owned capital and private capital.Private enterprises introduce state-owned capital through equity transfer,change the actual controller,transmit positive information to the market,obtain financing resources,alleviate the equity pledge crisis,and promote the improvement of enterprise business performance and value.Therefore,studying the resolution of equity pledge risks by the intervention of state-owned capital is of great significance for alleviating the equity pledge crisis of listed companies,strengthening the supervision of equity pledge in China,promoting the reform of mixed ownership.This paper selects Sunward as the research object,sorts out the overview of both parties to the bailout,the background of equity pledge and the process of introducing state-owned capital,analyzes the risks arising from the high proportion of equity pledge of controlling shareholders and the means of state-owned capital bailout,and uses financial indicators such as improvement efficiency coefficient method,economic added value,Tobin Q value,etc.,to compare the equity pledge ratio,financial performance,enterprise value and impact on small and medium-sized shareholders of private enterprises before and after the intervention of state-owned capital.The results of this paper find that: firstl y,the equity structure of Sunward is relatively concentrated,and the controlling shareholder has the absolute right to speak,and the equity pledge is carried out for the motives of financing,strengthening control and interest encroachment,which causes control transfer risks,financial risks and moral hazards.Second,state-owned capital intervened to ease the constraints of intelligent financing by improving the loan structure,issuing ultra-short-term financing bonds,and establishing financial leasin g companies.Improve the efficiency of Sunward governance through equity checks and balances,the appointment of personnel of the board of directors and the board of supervisors,and the improvement of the company’s articles of association;Synergies throu gh business cooperation.Finally,the intervention of state-owned capital can significantly reduce the equity pledge ratio of controlling shareholders by way of sub-pledge,promote the improvement of the company’s financial performance and value,and prote ct the rights and interests of minority shareholders.By studying the mitigating effect of state-owned asset intervention on the equity pledge risk of private enterprises,this paper enriches the relevant research literature on equity pledge and mixed ownership reform.This paper will help regulatory authorities improve the information disclosure system of equity pledge behavior,strengthen the construction of legal system and external supervision.It will help alleviate the financing constraints faced by p rivate enterprises by broadening corporate financing channels and establishing a multi-level capital market;It will help government departments clarify the criteria for relief targets and improve corporate governance capabilities by giving full play to the advantages of state-owned assets;It will help establish a risk-sharing mechanism and a rescue effect evaluation mechanism,actively promote the participation of state-owned capital in the bailout,and deepen the reform of mixed ownership. |