| At present,China ’s capital market has caught the ’ tailwind ’ of the development of the times,grasped the opportunities brought by the times,and stepped up its rapid development.The number of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies alone is close to 5000.At the same time,the capital market also faces some challenges in the development process.For example,the controlling shareholders occupy the funds of listed companies repeatedly.According to statistics,more than 80 % of listed companies are controlled by controlling shareholders.In this context,controlling shareholders will use their own equity advantages to implement tunneling behavior.Although a relatively complete internal control and supervision system has been established within the enterprise,and external regulatory agencies are also constantly increasing regulatory penalties to strive to effectively curb such acts,it is still difficult to prevent,detect and control in reality.It not only threatens the development of listed companies,but also violates the rights and interests of small and medium-sized investors and creditors,and hinders the healthy development of the capital market.This paper uses two methods of literature research and case analysis.Firstly,it introduces the theoretical concepts related to the tunneling of controlling shareholders,such as controlling shareholders and tunneling behavior,and expounds the principal-agent theory,control benefit theory and CRIME theory.The above theory provides a basis for the later analysis of * ST Furen ’s controlling shareholder ’s tunneling behavior and puts forward countermeasures and suggestions.Secondly,it introduces the specific situation of * ST Furen’s controlling shareholders ’ tunneling of listed companies,including the basic situation,ownership structure and organizational structure of * ST Furen,and reviews the relevant tunneling events.Thirdly,based on the CRIME theory,this paper makes a comprehensive and multi-angle analysis from five aspects : the actor(C),the means(R),the motivation(I),the regulatory system(M)and the consequences(E),and concludes the reasons and specific performance of * ST Furen being hollowed out.After that,on the basis of the previous analysis,this paper puts forward countermeasures and suggestions from four aspects :listed companies,intermediaries,regulators and investors.Finally,based on the above analysis,the research conclusions and enlightenment are drawn.The conclusion of the study found that the ownership structure of the listed company’s internal ’ dominance ’,the governance structure of the ’ virtual ’,and the defective internal control are the root causes of the controlling shareholder ’s tunneling behavior;the lack of supervision of external audit and the failure of supervision of regulatory agencies have facilitated the implementation of tunneling by controlling shareholders and created conditions;in addition,the bad motivation of controlling shareholders and the lack of awareness,ability and channel of small and medium-sized investors are the main reasons for the tunneling of controlling shareholders.Therefore,it is concluded that if listed companies want to develop healthily and sustainably,they need to optimize the ownership structure,improve the governance structure and strengthen internal control within the company.In addition,it is necessary to improve the quality and independence of external audit,increase the supervision and punishment of external supervision;strengthen the guidance and restraint of controlling shareholders and enhance the protection of small and medium investors.Through the above in-depth study of the case of * ST Furen Company ’s controlling shareholder hollowing out listed companies,we hope to provide some reference suggestions for listed companies,relevant stakeholders,external audit institutions and regulatory authorities,and also hope to provide reference for the analysis of other cases of controlling shareholders hollowing out listed companies in the capital market. |
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