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Study On The Effect Of Debt Financing To Tunneling Of Controlling Shareholders Of Private Listed Companies In China

Posted on:2017-06-22Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y Y HanFull Text:PDF
GTID:2349330536950747Subject:Business Administration
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Since the late 1990 s,some scholars such as Lo Porta found most companies have concentrated ownership in many countries.Under this background the main agency problem is not the conflicts of the management and outside shareholders,but the controlling shareholders in order to maximize their own interests to encroach on the interests of minority shareholders.The controlling shareholders for their own interests transfer the company’s assets and profits out of the companies is called "Tunneling".Statistics has showed that with the advancement of privatization reform in China,the number of private listed companies in our country is increasing,many controlling shareholder’s tunneling behavior has become the general phenomenon in Chinese private listed companies.Big shareholders and minority shareholders’ agency problem has bad influence on the development of private enterprises.Because of the imperfect legal protection of minority shareholders,the behavior of the controlling shareholders encroach on minority shareholders interests can not be stopped.How to effectively regulate the behavior of shareholders,reduce its tunneling behavior has become an unavoidable realistic topic on capital market.Reviewing and summarizing the relevant theory of debt financing and tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders,I analysis the influence mechanism of financing scale,allotted time structure and the way of debt on tunneling behavior from the perspectives of creditors in corporate governance effect.Using 183 panel data of Chinese private listed firms from 2009 to 2014,with the methods of pearson regression and linear regression I analysis different financing scale,allotted time structure and the way of debt on tunneling behavior.This paper provides rich and systematic evidence to the effect of the corporate governance and the debt financing to tunneling of controlling shareholders.Finally,on the basis of empirical research,I put forward some suggestions about our country’s macro policy and private listed companies.It not only helps us to improve the role of debt financing in the company,but also to optimize the financing structure of private listed companies in our country and improve the efficiency of corporate governance,It has positive effect to protect the interests of outside investors.
Keywords/Search Tags:Debt financing, Interests occupation, Controlling shareholder, Tunneling behavior
PDF Full Text Request
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