| In 2013,the adoption of “the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China’s Decision on Comprehensively Deepening the Reform of Some Major Issues” provided a clear policy basis for the implementation of the employee stock ownership plan.Subsequently,documents No.4,No.54 were issued to expand the application scope of the ESOP and clarified the specific implementation procedures.With the support of policies,and the convenience and low threshold of ESOP compared with equity incentive,more enterprises begin to launch ESOP.Employee Stock Ownership Plan is an institutional arrangement that enables employees to hold the company’s stock through secondary market purchase,share gift,etc.,so as to enjoy the residual claim and decision-making power.However,the specific implementation situation is not ideal.According to the statistics of Guotai ’an the floating loss of ESOP exceeds 70%.At the same time,there are many chaos in the design of specific program elements of ESOP,such as stock source,subscription price,subscription distribution,etc.For example,in the ESOP,the subscription ratio of executives reaches 100%;Star Technology will give shares to employees free of charge;ESOP has become a tool for shareholders to reduce their holdings.Why do ESOPs have such a result? What are the reasons?This paper chooses Mengolian M-grass’ s ESOP as the research object.And the case has the guarantee clause and the behavior of major shareholders transferring shares,which provides a situation for studying the controlling shareholders of participants.At the same time,the causes of its serious floating losses are in line with the contents to be studied.With the scholars’ attention to the participants,this paper studies the motivation,economic consequences and causes of the participants from the perspective of stakeholders.Firstly,combining with the background of the launch,from the perspective of company,major shareholders and employees,it analyzes the participation motivation of each subject;Secondly,it shows the specific economic consequences of this ESOP under this motivation;Finally,it explores the causes of economic consequences.The findings are as follows:(1)The motivation for the launch of the ESOP is complicated,and both incentive motivation and non-incentive motivation coexist.The major shareholders have obvious self-interest motives.(2)From the perspective of companies and employees,the economic consequences of this ESOP are measured,and it is found that the implementation effect is poor and the incentive is insufficient.(3)The ineffective implementation of the ESOP is rooted in the realization of self-interest of major shareholders and the inferior position of employees.Furthermore,the clause design is more in line with the needs of major shareholders so that lacks incentives;The purchase price has no advantage so that the incentive is weak;Shareholders’ behavior is not conducive to stock price stability,and they are not committed to the change of performance.In the end,the implementation effect of this ESOP is poor and the floating loss is serious.By case analysis,this paper analyzes the motivation,economic consequences and causes of ESOP,and shows the behavior path of controlling shareholders in ESOP,which enriches the theoretical research on the motivation,controlling shareholders’ behavior and economic consequences of ESOP.The practical contribution is mainly to help employees identify the real motivation of ESOP,avoid irrational investment by investors,and help regulators find the existing problems in the implementation of ESOP,and better regulate the behaviors of participants.Finally,this paper draws the following suggestions:(1)Employees should be aware that they are at a disadvantage and be cautious in participating in ESOP;(2)When designing ESOP,companies should pay attention to the coordination of interests of stakeholders;(3)Regulatory authorities should appropriately raise the threshold for launching ESOP,and pay special attention to the ESOP involving major shareholders. |
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