Research On The Influence Of Ownership Structure Without Actual Controller On Corporate Innovation

With the rapid and in-depth development of China’s capital market,A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen have gradually entered"The era of shareholding decentralization",and more and more listed companies have issued announcements that they are in the state of shareholding without actual controllers.According to Wind and CSMAR database,the number of listed companies without actual controller in China’s capital market has reached 280 by the end of 2021.At the specific practice level,this paper finds that there is no inevitable link between having an actual controller and good corporate governance effects,and some listed companies without actual controllers even have better performance and innovation performance.Innovation,as an important manifestation of the core competitiveness of enterprises,plays a significant role in the long-term sustainable operation of enterprises,and is one of the topics of high interest in academic and practical sessions.As a product of the era of highly decentralized shareholding,it is of great theoretical and practical significance to further reform the shareholding structure of enterprises whether companies without actual controllers can play a facilitating role in promoting corporate innovation and thus realize an increase in overall corporate value.This paper takes listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares in China(excluding financial,ST and~*ST companies)from 2010-2021 as the research object,and constructs a fixed-effects model to conduct an empirical analysis and finds that:the control of the original controlling shareholder is weakened in the context of no actual controller,which can release the decision-making power of managers and stimulate their enthusiasm for innovation,and the management will be more inclined to act in the overall interests of the enterprise Management is also more inclined to invest in innovation in the overall interest of the company.The paper also explores the moderating effects of internal governance and financial regulatory factors on innovation investment in firms without actual controllers and analyzes the heterogeneity and economic mechanisms.The main findings of this paper are as follows:firstly,the shareholding structure of no actual controller can promote innovation investment;secondly,the combination of two positions,increasing the shareholding of management and strengthening the compensation incentive for management can strengthen the promotion of innovation by no actual controller;thirdly,financial regulation inhibits the promotion of innovation by no actual controller.This paper also finds that the coexistence of multiple major shareholders formed under the trend of no actual controller is not conducive to the promotion effect of no actual controller on corporate innovation,as well as the enhancement effect of no actual controller on corporate innovation investment is more obvious in non-state-owned enterprises and high-tech industries.In view of the above research findings,according to the classical control theory and the related research on shareholding structure,this paper argues that in the era of shareholding decentralization,the state of shareholding without actual controller is a manifestation of the decentralized shareholding structure,but it is different from the control of minority shareholders under the decentralized shareholding,which is very likely to generate the problems such as the absence of controlling shareholders and thus the inequality of power and responsibility and the inefficiency of corporate decision-making.However,in this paper,after combing the sample of domestic listed companies without actual controllers and through empirical analysis,we find that listed companies without actual controllers have better innovation investment performance.In addition,in the era of decentralization of shareholding,listed companies without actual controllers can also promote innovation investment by adopting a two-position leadership structure,increasing the shareholding ratio of management and strengthening executive compensation incentives,so this paper is valuable to enrich the research results in the field of shareholding structure without actual controllers.