| In the domestic capital market,backdoor listing has a lower threshold than an initial public offering,but in China’s short development time,in order to protect the interests of the party in the information asymmetry,backdoor listing transactions often sign performance commitment agreements.Performance commitments usually bring positive market signals,motivate managers to complete their commitments,safeguard the interests of small and medium-sized investors,and improve the efficiency of backdoor listings.However,many companies take a fancy to the characteristics that performance promises can increase the company’s valuation and raise the stock price,deliberately sign commitment targets that exceed the normal profit level,and then adjust the company’s operating data through earnings management to accurately achieve performance commitments in order to avoid high performance compensation and maintain the company’s stock price.This article examines the impact of performance commitments signed by backdoor listed companies on their earnings management behavior.Compared with the existing theoretical research on backdoor listing,performance commitment and earnings management,this paper focuses on analyzing the impact of performance commitment on earnings management in backdoor listing,which can supplement and expand the existing research,has certain academic value,and also helps the backdoor parties to correctly understand the performance commitment and its risks,provide a reference for a more reasonable performance commitment compensation agreement and the valuation of the underlying asset,and also help provide ideas for regulators.In the process of research,this paper theoretically analyzes the impact of performance commitment in earnings management of backdoor listed companies,mainly including the role of performance commitment in backdoor listing,the motivation of earnings management under performance commitment and the earnings management mode adopted.Then,through the case of backdoor trading of Co.A,the motivation for earnings management is analyzed,and the improved Jones model and financial data are used to identify its earnings management and means,and analyze the economic consequences of its earnings management,so as to draw the relevant conclusions and suggestions of this paper:In the process of backdoor listing,the parties to the transaction tend to sign performance commitments,but the inflated goals of performance commitments will aggravate the motivation of the company’s earnings management,and the false impression of performance standards generated by earnings management will make the listed company obtain short-term benefits,but also damage the long-term interests of investors.Therefore,it is necessary to improve the performance commitment of backdoor listing,introduce indicators such as non-profit performance to enrich the setting of performance commitment,set differentiated commitment periods so that they can cover the asset forecast cycle,and strengthen external supervision and punishment to eliminate the market environment. |
