| In recent years,the sharing economy has widely penetrated into all fields of production and life.As a new way of travel,shared travel has the most profound impact on public travel.At present,online ride-hailing has gradually become the first choice for public travel.In addition,there is an imbalance between supply and demand in the travel market.In view of this,this paper considers different market competition environments and analyzes the subsidy and pricing strategies of online car-hailing platforms under different supply and demand conditions.The main research of this paper includes the following three aspects : Firstly,the pricing strategy of the online car-hailing platform with duopoly competition in the case of subsidies is studied.When the supply exceeds the demand in the travel market,the online car-hailing platform separately subsidizes passengers and when the supply is less than the demand in the travel market,the online car-hailing platform separately subsidizes drivers.Based on the Hotelling model,the pricing strategy of the online car-hailing platform is analyzed,and the influence of each parameter on the profit of the online car-hailing platform is explored.The study found that the subsidy strategy can increase the profit of the platform,and when the subsidies of the two competing platforms reach a competitive equilibrium state at a certain threshold.Secondly,considering the existence of express and carpooling services in a monopoly online car-hailing platform during the travel trough period,by constructing the passenger utility function,the optimal pricing strategy of the online car-hailing platform under the two conditions of whether considering the passenger ’s low-carbon preference and the platform ’s subsidy to the passenger is analyzed respectively.The study finds that the passenger ’s low-carbon preference,the platform ’s subsidy to carpooling passengers,the number of carpooling passengers and the platform ’s service quality are positively correlated with the platform ’s profit.Finally,in view of the difficulty of taking a taxi during rush hours such as commuting and holidays in reality,the utility function and platform profit function of express drivers and carpool drivers in the monopoly network car-hailing platform are constructed,and the optimal pricing strategy of the network car-hailing platform under the two conditions of whether the platform subsidizes carpool drivers is analyzed.The study finds that the platform ’s subsidy to carpool drivers and the cross-subsidy sensitivity coefficient of express drivers have a positive impact on the profit of the network car-hailing platform. |
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