Research On The Influence Of Stickiness Of Executive Compensation On Inefficiency Investment Of Electronic Information Manufacturing Enterprises

The transformation and upgrading of Chinese manufacturing to the direction of "advanced,sophisticated and sophisticated" is an important strategic deployment of China’s initiative to embrace the fourth industrial revolution,and also a key measure to realize "Made in China2025".As a key field of "advanced,sophisticated and sophisticated",the electronic information manufacturing industry,promoting its high-quality and efficient development,is the key to ensure the realization of the above strategy and objectives.As one of the important ways of enterprise resource allocation,the operation efficiency of investment activity is closely related to the speed and quality of enterprise development.Under the modern enterprise system,senior professional managers are responsible for the landing and implementation of investment decisions,and the quality of their performance is an important factor affecting investment activities.As an important governance measure for enterprises to promote managers to perform their duties with high quality and efficiency,the design of compensation incentive contract is not uniform,and the design of different forms of compensation incentive contract will have different impacts on managers’ performance.Therefore,it is of great significance to study the influence of incentive contract design of sticky executive compensation,which is characterized by sticky executive compensation phenomenon,on inefficient investment of electronic information manufacturing enterprises for improving resource utilization rate and realizing overall high-quality and efficient development of electronic information manufacturing enterprises.In this paper,electronic information manufacturing enterprises from 2013 to 2021 are selected as research samples.Literature research method,normative research method and empirical analysis method are adopted to explore the existence of stickiness of executive compensation and the relationship among stickiness of executive compensation,agency cost and inefficient investment.And the introduction of corporate governance,to explore the regulatory role of corporate governance.First of all,this paper reviews and reviews the domestic and foreign literatures related to the stickiness of executive compensation and inefficient investment.Secondly,it defines the stickiness of executive compensation,inefficient investment and other related concepts,and expounds the principal-agent theory and optimal compensation contract theory as the research basis.Thirdly,theoretical analysis is carried out based on the above theoretical exposition and concept definition,the research hypothesis of the paper is proposed,and the index calculation model and hypothesis testing model are constructed.Fourthly,descriptive statistical analysis,correlation analysis and multiple regression analysis were further carried out on the sample data to empirically test the research hypothesis.Finally,based on the empirical analysis results,this paper puts forward relevant suggestions from the perspectives of improving executive incentive and corporate governance,so as to restrain the inefficient investment of electronic information manufacturing enterprises.The results show that the sticky phenomenon of executive compensation is common in the electronic information manufacturing industry,and its existence is more likely to be the optimal compensation design to alleviate the agency problem.The stickiness of executive compensation has a significant negative correlation with the overall,over-investment and under-investment of the electronic information manufacturing enterprises.That is to say,the stickiness of executive compensation can help restrain the overall inefficient investment of the electronic information manufacturing enterprises.Agency cost plays a partial intermediary role,that is,there is an influence path of "stickiness of executive compensation-agency cost-inefficient investment" in electronic information manufacturing enterprises.Corporate governance plays a significant role in regulating and promoting the influence of stickiness of executive compensation on inefficient investment of electronic information manufacturing enterprises.