Hybrid Equity Structure Of State-Owned Enterprises,Capital Occupation Of Large Shareholders And Real Earnings Management

In our country,state-owned enterprises,as the key lifeline of national modernization and the protection of people’s interests,are the important base of social economic operation,so their healthy and stable development is very important.At present,due to their own needs for survival and development and related mixed ownership policies,state-owned enterprises through the introduction of different forms of non-state-owned shareholders and in the form of a hybrid equity structure.At the same time,because the regulation of accrual earnings has been strengthened and the space of manipulation has been compressed,the manipulation of real earnings management with higher concealment and greater harm has become the main means of earnings management in state-owned enterprises,therefore,it becomes the turning point of this paper’s research and discussion.As state-owned enterprises often have the problems of “One-share dominance” and“Client administration” of the state-owned controlling shareholders,the large state-owned shareholders have the motive and ability to manipulate the general meeting of shareholders,the board of directors and the management.As a result,they will obtain private benefits of control through the use of funds and other means to “Hollow out” the enterprise.Then they will use their absolute control to cover up the abuse of other small and medium-sized shareholders and the interests of the enterprise,through the real earnings management earnings manipulation,and whitewash financial statements.By introducing non-state-owned shareholders of different nature,state-owned enterprises can improve the diversity of mixed equity and the and balances of mixed equity.These diversified non-state-owned shareholders can bring abundant information and resources to state-owned enterprises,optimize governance structure,alleviate agency problems,adjust business objectives,and improve business performance,and play the role of supervision and restraint state-owned shareholders and management,so as to ease the real earnings management motivation and limit the real earnings management behavior.At the same time,when the rights of the statecontrolling shareholders are monitored and balanced by the non-state-controlling shareholders of different natures,their behavior of seeking private interests through the occupation of funds will be restricted,and the behavior of the large shareholders to occupy funds will be reduced accordingly,and then they can play the role to prohibit and reduce the real earnings management.In this paper,by using the data of Chinese state-owned enterprises listed of 2013-2021 to conduct an empirical study.The mixed equity structure was measured by the mixed equity diversity and the mixed equity balances,and probes into the inhibiting effect on the real earnings management of state-owned enterprises,and verifies the mediating effect of large shareholders capital occupation through mechanism testing.The results show that:(1)Mixed ownership structure can restrain the real earnings management behavior of state-owned enterprises,specifically,the improvement of mixed equity diversity and mixed equity balance can restrain the real earnings management behavior of state-owned enterprises,(2)The capital occupation of large shareholders plays a part of intermediary role between mixed ownership structure and real earnings management,which means,with the improvement of mixed ownership diversity and mixed equity balance,the capital occupation of large shareholders of state-owned enterprises decreases,and the real earnings management behavior will be restrained,(3)Through further research,it is found that higher accounting conservatism and higher internal control quality can enhance the inhibition of mixed equity diversity and mixed equity balance on real earnings management.Based on the above research results,this paper puts forward some policy suggestions on how to exert the inhibition of mixed ownership structure on real earnings management and points out the shortcomings of this paper and future research directions.The main contribution of this paper is to explore the restraining effect of mixed ownership structure on real earnings management from two aspects: the mixed equity diversity and the mixed equity balance.This paper also verifies the intermediary role of the large shareholder occupancy between the mixed ownership structure and the real earnings management.Besides,it is approved that the positive effect of the mixed ownership structure of the state-owned enterprises while enriching the relevant research.What’s more,it also provides some ideas to reduce the funds occupancy of large shareholders of state-owned enterprises and the concrete path to restrain the real earnings management of state-owned enterprises.