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Evolutionary Game Research On The Ownership Structure Of Mixed-ownership Enterprises

Posted on:2019-07-07Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Z W ShiFull Text:PDF
GTID:2429330545482879Subject:Western economics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
In the process of discussing the interest game about the internal ownership structure of the mixed ownership company,some scholars believe that in order to realize the steady improvement of the company performance and the healthy development of the national macro-economy,we must reasonably optimize the ownership structure of the current mixed ownership company in China.However,many studies have found that both highly dispersed ownership structure and highly centralized ownership structure are not necessarily conducive to or not conducive to the reform of mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises in China,because the choice of an efficient ownership structure varies according to the situation of different industries and enterprises.For mixed ownership companies in competitive industries,to successfully promote the reform of mixed ownership is to deal with the contradiction between shareholders,however,this depends on the large shareholders,small and medium-sized shareholders and other multi-party game in the process of strategic choice.Therefore,the key point of this paper is to reveal the strategic choice between large shareholders and small and medium shareholders in the ownership structure of mixed ownership companies by the method of evolutionary game theory,and to explore how to optimize the relevant parameters that affect their strategic choice in order to make the choice of both sides of the game towards evolutionary stable equilibrium,to maximize the value of the company.Based on this,this paper first combed and summarized the previous research conclusions,elaborated the relevant concepts and theories,and then analyzed the current situation of the equity reform of China's mixed ownership companies,and put forward some existing problems.Irn the following part of the empirical study,this paper examines the factors affecting the conflict of interest between heterogeneous shareholders,and gives a dynamic game model of the conflict of interest between heterogeneous shareholders of mixed ownership companies,and uses the evolutionary game theory to copy the dynamic analysis,stability analysis and simulation of the game model.The research results show that the strategy choice of both shareholders is not only determined by the initial state of equity structure,but also depends on the good corporate govermance environment,and the improvement of corporate governance environment is the key to guide the game to stable equilibrium.The author believes that in order to make the strategic choice of both shareholders develop towards the direction of stable and balanced evolution,we must make joint efforts from three aspects:perfecting China's capital market,improving the internal governance mechanism and strengthening the cultivation of external governance market.
Keywords/Search Tags:Mixed ownership, Ownership structure, Corporate governance, Large shareholders, Small and medium shareholders, Evolutionary game
PDF Full Text Request
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