| State-owned enterprises have a single shareholding structure,characterized by the single-largest-shareholder ownership structure,which lack effective mechanisms to ensure checks and balances.This model directly leads to some problems such as non-standard management,inefficient resource allocation,insufficient market competitiveness and insufficient development motivation.In order to cope with the current complex and changing domestic and international economic environment,SOEs may need to use equity incentives to make comprehensive adjustment and scientific allocation of production factors and resources in the process of reform,so as to mobilize the enthusiasm of the staff and bring more business benefits to the enterprises.However,in the implementation of equity incentives,companies often carry out some surplus management within the scope of accounting standards and laws and regulations,which can maximize the value of the incentive recipients and the enterprise,but this behavior does not ensure the long-term healthy development of the enterprise.Therefore,when implementing equity incentives,SOEs should not only improve the system in the light of their own special characteristics,but also propose targeted solutions to the problems exposed in the process.In this way,this system on enterprises and employees can play a positive role to fullest extent.Company F is one of the early state-owned enterprises to implement equity incentives.The analysis of its surplus management under equity incentives has certain reference value for state-owned enterprises to design incentive programs and control the impact of surplus management behaviors.This paper reviews the theoretical framework related to equity incentive and surplus management,and categorizes the results of domestic and foreign scholars’ literature.After introducing the industry background of Company F,the enterprise profile and the background and process of implementing equity incentive,the paper analyzes the financial indicators related to the achievement of equity incentive performance.In the light of the financial situation,it gets the conclusion that the abnormal changes of financial data are probably due to the incentive targets.After proving the existence of surplus management by using the method of profit separation,the paper analyzes the way of surplus management of the company and the consequences of the company using case study,comparative analysis and qualitative and quantitative analysis,and make suggestions for the adverse effects of surplus management under the company’s equity incentive.The paper summarizes the following points: Firstly,during the period of equity incentive,the manager of Company F,as permitted by accounting standards and laws and regulations,increased the revenue and profit by means of surplus management such as credit policy,asset impairment loss,period expense and grant price.Secondly,the surplus management practices implemented during the equity incentive period played a positive role in the improvement of corporate performance,the expansion of market size and the security of employees’ rights.However,it affected the long-term asset cycle and financial position of the enterprise and was detrimental to the interests of small and medium-sized investors.Third,Company F should control the adverse effects of its surplus management behavior under equity incentive by optimizing the equity incentive plan,strengthening internal supervision and improving relevant laws and regulations. |
