| In recent years,the state has vigorously promoted the reform of state-owned enterprises,and its number and scale have achieved remarkable results,and its healthy development also affects the development of operational state-owned assets,and at the same time affects the healthy development of the national economy.Therefore,the public is paying more and more attention to state-owned enterprises,and the topic of income transfer has gradually been put on the issue,including one of the important measures for the implementation of state-owned enterprises.The state-owned capital operation budget system has been piloted in some central enterprises since 2007,and this measure also marks a new chapter in the history of state-owned enterprises to pay profits.Since the implementation of the system,many scholars have carried out theoretical analysis and empirical tests on their implementation effects.On the one hand,many scholars believe that the implementation of the state-owned capital operating budget has a positive impact,can improve the performance of state-owned enterprises,and promote the preservation and appreciation of state-owned enterprises.On the other hand,some scholars believe that China’s state-owned capital operating budget system is still in its infancy.The stage needs to be further improved,and its implementation effect has certain limitations.As for the research on the implementation effect of the system,focusing on investment efficiency,enterprise performance and capital allocation,of course,some scholars also discuss the implementation effect of the system from the perspective of accrued earnings management.Therefore,combining the motives and means of state-owned enterprise earnings management,this paper intends to explore the implementation effect of income surrender from the perspective of real earnings management.At the same time,management monetary compensation is an important component of corporate governance.At present,there are not many studies on the relationship between management incentives and earnings management,but the conclusions are still inconsistent,and most of them focus on accrued earnings management.From January 1,2004,China implemented the Interim Measures for the Performance Evaluation of the Heads of Central Enterprises,which clearly defined the monetary compensation of the management of the central enterprises,and further supplemented and improved them in 2006.Therefore,this paper will The relationship between the implementation of monetary compensation incentives of central enterprise management and real earnings management behavior is also included in the empirical study of this paper.Considering that the effect of management incentives directly affects the management and management behavior of management,which affects the payment of benefits,this paper also discusses its impact on the implementation of the state-owned capital operating budget system.Under the premise of summarizing the existing research literature,this paper uses the normative research and empirical analysis to carry out the research of this paper,and discusses the implementation effect of the state-owned capital management budget system from the perspective of real earnings management,implemented in 2004-2009.The state-owned capital holding listed company of the state-owned capital operating budget system,as a test group,matched the corresponding control group samples through the PSM nuclear matching method,and then tested the implementation effect of the state-owned capital operating budget system through the DID model.Then as an important part of corporate governance,this paper studies the impact of management monetary compensation incentives on the real earnings management behavior of enterprises,and then uses the management monetary compensation as a moderator to examine its role in regulating the implementation of state-owned capital management budget system..Finally,based on the analysis of the empirical research results,the conclusions of this paper are drawn,and corresponding suggestions are given based on the conclusions and the irrational system existing in China.The conclusions of this paper are as follows:(1)The implementation of the state-owned capital operation budget system can effectively restrain the real earnings management behavior of enterprises;(2)the monetary compensation incentives are negatively correlated with the real earnings management behavior of enterprises;(3)the monetary compensation incentives have significantly promoted The negative relationship between the implementation of the state-owned capital operating budget system and the real surplus management of enterprises.Based on the empirical research conclusions of this paper,the policy recommendations given in this paper are as follows:(1)Increasing the enterprises within the scope of budget implementation,and extending the state-owned capital operating budget system to more enterprises-broadening the budget from both horizontal and vertical perspectives The scope of the enterprise covered;(2)Improve the salary incentive mechanism of the central enterprise-fundamentally,the management of the state-owned enterprise should change its inherent role orientation and traditional viewpoint;from the company level,the establishment of monetary compensation incentives The salary incentive system;from the perspective of the entire market,gradually improve the selection and employment mechanism of professional managers,accelerate the process of marketization;(3)gradually improve the enterprise supervision and management system.Accelerate the reform of mixed ownership,multi-party participation in the management of central enterprises,expand the financing channels and scope of social capital,thereby injecting fresh blood into the central enterprises,and effectively increasing the supervision of central enterprises,thereby inhibiting the short-sighted behavior of executives;Accelerate the establishment and improvement of the long-term incentive system,accelerate the promotion of the equity incentive system,coordinate it with monetary compensation incentives,and give full play to the positive governance role of management. |
