The State Audit And The Investment And Financing Period Mismatch Of State-owned Enterprises

From 2020,the COVID-19 has faced serious uncertainty in the domestic economic situation,and Chinese enterprises have faced serious financial constraints.In particular,the long-term repayment period is very long.In order to control risks,banks and other financial institutions tend to issue short-term loans,while companies cannot obtain sufficient long-term funds.Therefore,they increasingly support the long-term investment demand of short-term loans.That is,the mismatch between investment and financing period.State-owned companies are characterised by ’one share is dominant’ and ’no owner’,and the mismatch in terms of investment and financing is increasingly evident.This behavior violates the basic principle of matching the payback period of investment with the financing period.If the bank carries out "loan cut-off" and "loan withdrawal" or tightens the standard of loan renewal,the enterprise will fall into financing difficulties,causing the break of the capital chain,not only causing the enterprise to fall into financial difficulties,but also transmitting to the entire financial system through debt default,and may also cause unemployment and affect social stability.State-owned enterprises are a pillar of economic development and are essential for the smooth functioning of the Chinese economy.How can we effectively reduce the mismatch between investment and financing conditions for state-owned enterprises? National audit is an important external governance mechanism of state-owned enterprises,with transcendent independence and strong deterrent power,which can effectively exert the governance effect on state-owned enterprises.So can state audit restrain the mismatch of investment and financing terms of state-owned enterprises? If so,is the State Audit hindered by the non-conformity of the investment and financing period of the state-owned enterprises,what they intend to do or what they have no choice to do? In addition,what is the functional mechanism of the State Audit to limit the mismatch between investment and financing conditions of state-owned enterprises? What is the difference between different scenarios in which national audit is restricted when the investment and financing conditions of state-owned enterprises do not match?In order to solve the aforementioned problems,based on the results of the audit communicated by the National Audit Office over the years,this paper selects the central enterprise groups and their holding enterprises in the countries audited by the National Audit Office as the experimental group,and build a difference model to empirically test the impact of state audit on state-owned enterprises’ non-compliance with investment and financing conditions.The study found :(1)the state audit can effectively restrain the investment and financing term mismatch of state-owned enterprises.(2)the results show that undertakings do not have a long-term funding constraint and are faced with weak funding constraints,National audit plays a more important role in tackling mismatches in investment and financing conditions of state-owned enterprises,That is,the state audit can restrain the investment and financing term mismatch behavior of state-owned enterprises.(3)Further studies have shown that improving the quality of internal control is an important mechanism of national audit to limit mismatches in investment and financing conditions of state-owned enterprises;When company directors and managers are decentralised,agency costs for companies are low and are not audited by four large companies,the state audit has a more significant deterrent effect on the unfairness of investment and financing conditions for public companies.Possible research contributions and innovations in this document are:(1)Based on the audit perspective of the National Audit Office on the central enterprise group,this document examines the impact of managing a national audit on limiting mismatches in investment and financing conditions of state-owned enterprises.It enriches theoretical research on the impact of the management of the national audit and the factors influencing the non-compliance of the investment and financing conditions of state-owned enterprises.(2)This paper studies whether the state audit suppresses the investment and financing term mismatch behavior of state-owned enterprises intentionally or reluctantly.(3)This paper studies the mechanism of state audit to inhibit the mismatch of investment and financing terms of state-owned enterprises under general circumstances.(4)Study the effect of the national audit on the non-compliance of investment and conditions for public entrepreneurs financing in other internal and external conditions.The conclusion of the study will help to standardise the operating behaviour of state-owned enterprises,reduce the operational risk of state-owned enterprises,increase the value of state-owned enterprises and maintain the quality of economic development.