| China’s state-owned enterprises are generally faced with the problem of inefficient investment,which will not only bring negative effects to the enterprises themselves,but also lead to the waste of national resources and ultimately restrict the development of the national economy.In the critical period of the completion of the three-year reform of state-owned enterprises,it is even more important to explore ways to improve the investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises.In 2015,the General Office of the CPC Central Committee and the General Office of the State Council issued the Framework Opinions on Several Issues Concerning Improving the Audit System and related supporting documents,It is proposed to "implement full audit coverage of public funds,state-owned assets,state-owned resources and the economic performance of leading cadres.Under the new background,exploring the mechanism of the role of national audit in improving the inefficient investment behavior of state-owned enterprises from the perspective of full national audit coverage has become a subject worthy of in-depth study.In order to explore the impact of the proposed macro policy of full coverage of national audit on the micro-governance effect,this paper takes provincial state-owned enterprises as the research object,selects the non-efficiency investment data of non-financial and non-ST provincial state-owned enterprises from 2010 to 2018 as the research sample,and constructs the indicators of economic responsibility audit coverage and audit object coverage,To study the impact of the coverage of provincial audit institutions on the inefficient behavior of state-owned enterprises.The national audit coverage rate and the national audit quality represent the two dimensions of the national audit breadth and depth,respectively.Therefore,this paper also introduces the national audit quality as an adjusting variable,and uses the rectification rate of the amount of the audit treatment penalty as an alternative measure of the national audit quality,to explore the regulatory role of the national audit quality in improving the inefficient investment behavior of state-owned enterprises through full audit coverage.The research results show that the improvement of economic responsibility audit coverage and audit object coverage can improve the inefficient investment behavior of provincial state-owned enterprises,and both of them are complementary to the role of national audit quality,that is,the improvement of national audit coverage and national audit quality can jointly improve the inefficient investment behavior of state-owned enterprises.This conclusion is still valid after changing the measurement method of national audit coverage and adding relevant control variables at the provincial level.The research conclusions of this paper can provide empirical support for the necessity of implementing full coverage of national audit from the perspective of micro-governance,and also provide policy recommendations for effectively promoting full coverage of audit.The research contributions of this paper are as follows:(1)From the perspective of audit coverage,this paper examines the impact of changes in the macro-regulatory environment on the inefficient investment behavior of state-owned enterprises,and provides a new theoretical basis for improving the inefficient investment behavior of state-owned enterprises.(2)This paper constructs a multi-dimensional audit coverage index,analyzes the mechanism and path of the impact of the implementation of the policy of full audit coverage on the inefficient investment of state-owned enterprises,and deepens the study of the impact of national audit on the microeconomic effect. |
