| In recent years,cases of illegal information disclosure by listed companies have become a hot spot in the securities market,and cases of illegal and fraudulent fraud have emerged one after another.In addition to causing abnormal stock price fluctuations due to penalties,they also misled investors,harmed their interests,and disrupted the order of the capital market.As an information intermediary agency in the capital market,analysts not only bring objective and professional investment information to investors,alleviate information asymmetry,but also play an important role in external supervision,providing important guarantees for regulating the behavior of listed companies and protecting the interests of investors.Based on information asymmetry theory,supervision theory,reputation theory and other related theories,this paper selects 2010-2019 years A-share listed companies as data samples,conducts empirical research on the relationship between analysts’ concerns and listed companies’ information disclosure violations and frequency of violations.And on this basis,though the entire intermediary variable of the first type of agency cost,the intermediary effect between the two is verified.In the further analysis,the influence of analysts on different types of listed companies is discussed,and the vertical concurrent appointment of senior management and the nature of property rights are discussed.The empirical results show that analysts’attention to the company’s information disclosure violations and the frequency of violations in the current year are both significantly negatively correlated;the first type of agency cost plays a part of the intermediary role between analysts’ attention and listed companies’ information disclosure violations;Regarding listed companies that hold concurrent positions vertically or state-owned,analysts are concerned about the weakening of the inhibitory effect on violations of information disclosure. |
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