An Empirical Study On The Effect Of Analysts’ Attention On Quality Of Information Disclosure

Information is the soul of the capital market, and information disclosure of high quality is beneficial for the efficiency of the capital market. As an information connector between investors and listed companies, also an external supervisor, analysts who could use its information intermediary function and external supervision function effectively will significantly improve the quality of information disclosure.So, based on order ologit regression and selecting companies from 2008 to 2013 of the main board listed A shares in Shenzhen Stock Exchange Market as the research object, this research empirically tests the effect of analysts’ attention on the quality of information disclosure and differences of its effect under nature of different property rights from analysts’ attention and its quality. The results show that:( 1) Analysts’ attention will significantly improve the quality of information disclosure.(2)The effect of star analysts’ attention on the quality of information disclosure which is stronger than ordinary analysts’ attention. Furthermore, the conclusion that the higher the total score, the better the quality of information disclosure can be found.(3)The effect of analysts’ attention on the quality of information disclosure in state-owned enterprises which is stronger than that in private enterprises.This paper may have three contributions. Firstly, for the first time, this research directly studies analysts’ attention how to influence the quality of information disclosure in Chinese stock market,using empirical method. Secondly, for the first time, it discusses the effect of analysts’ capacity on external governance from the perspective of heterogeneity. Thirdly, it discusses whether the analysts’ attention on external governanc will be influenced by the different property rights.