Research On Cooperative R&D Strategy Of Industrial Generic Technology Based On Game Theory Analysis

The report of the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China clearly stated that "strengthening basic research" is an important part of implementing the innovation-driven development strategy.Basic research is the foundation for scientific self-reliance and self-improvement,as emphasized by General Secretary Xi Jinping who pointed out that "strengthening basic research is an urgent requirement to achieve high-level scientific self-reliance and self-improvement,and it’s also a necessary path to build a world-leading science and technology power." As an important component of basic research,industrial generic technologies refer to fundamental general-purpose technologies that are widely used in multiple industries or fields and have bottleneck constraints on entire or multiple industries.Their achievements can be shared among different sectors and have profound impacts on current markets and business ecosystems.Currently,a new round of technological revolution and industrial transformation is flourishing.Accelerating the R&D of generic technologies,especially key generic technologies such as artificial intelligence,supercomputing,5G,and blockchain technology is an important part of promoting high-quality development in China’s manufacturing industry and enhancing the country’s overall competitiveness.Since 2018,restrictions on basic components and software technologies targeting Chinese high-tech companies such as ZTE and Huawei by the United States have highlighted the urgency of breakthroughs in generic technologies,particularly in key areas.To this end,General Secretary Xi Jinping emphasized that "we must enhance the innovation drive of enterprises,give full play to their role as problem-raisers,accelerate the establishment of innovation consortia led by leading enterprises and supported by universities and research institutes,and achieve synergies among all innovative entities." Exploring cooperation in generic technology R&D can help tackle key technological issues.In order to alleviate the lack of generic technology R&D entities,the lack of R&Dmotivation,and the problem of cooperation in various aspects of generic technology research and development,this article takes analyzing the current situation of generic technology R&Din China as the research starting point,focusing on the research on the mechanism of generic technology cooperation R&Dunder government support,aiming to solve the R&Ddifficulties faced by generic technologies.Therefore,this article runs through the entire process of generic technology research and development,revealing the key influencing factors and mechanisms of horizontal joint technology breakthroughs and vertical resource integration on generic technology in the supply and diffusion process.It establishes an evolutionary game model for the selection of generic technology cooperation R&Dstrategies under bidirectional collaboration,and explores the behavior,evolutionary stability,influencing factors,and evolutionary mechanisms of generic technology cooperation R&Dstrategy selection;Furthermore,to grasp the fundamental logic of continuous dynamic updates in the knowledge of generic technological innovation,differential game theory is used to distinguish whether the R&D effort level of upstream enterprises is observable,considering the support of information and communication technologies(ICTs).Differential game theory is used to construct a payment game model for generic technological cooperation R&D strategies under output dependence and effort dependence,and the application principle of payment strategies for generic technological cooperation R&D is analyzed,Assist in promoting industrial innovation in related fields.Through research,the following conclusions can be drawn:(1)In terms of comparison of cooperation strategy selection,when the incremental return on corporate strategy is greater than a certain threshold,the level of corporate R&D efforts has a positive impact on the realization of generic technical cooperation R&D strategies,and the positive effect of the vertical and horizontal two-way synergy coefficient is also based on the premise that the incremental return on strategy is greater than a certain threshold,since the threshold is smaller,This indicates that the level of R&D efforts made by R&D entities is premised on achieving two-way collaborative R&D,highlighting the importance of two-way collaboration for the selection of collaborative R&D strategies.(2)In terms of influencing factors,generic technological cooperation R&D is affected by multiple factors,and it is necessary to distinguish the characteristics and mechanisms of different influencing factors.Among them,the impact of two-way collaboration coefficient on different payment structure models is inconsistent,such as the horizontal collaboration coefficient improving the level of effort and total R&D profit under the three models;When the marginal revenue coefficient is large,the vertical synergy coefficient has a first decreasing and then increasing impact on the total R&D profit,and the two-way synergy coefficient is more sensitive in the effort dependent model.(3)In terms of payment structure model comparison,the output dependency model is superior to the benchmark model.As the fixed monitoring costs paid by leading enterprises become smaller,the effort dependency model will be superior to the benchmark model,even better than the output dependency model.The benchmark model does not require government subsidies,the output dependency model must provide subsidies to both sides,and the effort dependency model must provide full subsidies to universities and colleges,which are more dependent on government subsidies.Finally,relevant policy recommendations are proposed from the perspectives of the government and enterprises,providing a path basis for the research on generic technology cooperation R&D mechanism,and providing theoretical suggestions for the government to formulate policies to support generic technology cooperation R&D.The main innovation of this article lies in grasping the dynamic and procedural nature of generic technology R&D,vertically connecting the supply and diffusion of generic technology,while considering the differences and convergence of different main objectives,revealing the horizontal joint technological breakthroughs in a certain link,thereby revealing the two-way collaborative impact mechanism;The purpose of this study is to establish an evolutionary game model for generic technology cooperation R&D,in order to analyze the evolutionary process of generic technology cooperation R&D strategies,and determine the conditions,mechanisms,and influencing factors for achieving evolutionary stability strategies;Considering the support of information and intelligent technology for downstream enterprises to verify the research effort level of upstream enterprises,a differential game model of generic technology cooperation R&D payment strategies under output dependence and effort dependence is established from the perspective of benefit linkage and allocation,providing a reference for promoting the selection of generic technology cooperation R&D payment strategies.