Research On The Impact Of Listed Company Management Shareholding On Corporate Performance Based On Agency Cost

Since the 21st century,the economy has become more and more vigorous.In listed companies,shareholders have "ownership" and managers have "management rights" gradually,which has become a common state in the internal structure of enterprises.Due to the easy occurrence of information acquisition differences between corporate shareholders and agents,"adverse selection" and "moral problems" frequently occur,resulting in increased risks for shareholders to hire agents,increased management costs,and a series of principal-agent problems.At present,the market generally adopts the method of giving senior managers shares to maintain their loyalty to the company.This method is called management shareholding,which is one of the forms of equity incentives,which not only fully demonstrates corporate governance capabilities,but also reflects the superiority of the equity incentive model.This governance method is widely implemented in listed enterprises in China.This paper mainly studies how two types of agency costs produce mediating effects between management’s shareholding and corporate performance,and explores whether changes in the proportion of management’s shareholding can affect agency costs and further change corporate performance.This research can help companies reduce agency costs,reduce economic losses,and improve corporate performance.This paper combines the existing research experience of many experts and scholars in the financial field at home and abroad,selects the financial data of A-share listed companies in China from 2012 to 2021,takes the two types of principal-agent problems of enterprises as the empirical basis,builds a mesomeric effect model based on "management shareholding agency cost enterprise performance",examines its mechanism,and finds that the proportion of management personnel shareholding should be increased moderately,It can effectively suppress two types of agency costs,thereby improving corporate performance indicators,achieving the goal of increasing profits,helping to maintain shareholder interests,and improving corporate governance efficiency.This paper provides a new perspective for enterprises to reduce agency costs,and explores the mesomeric effect of two types of agency costs in the relationship between managerial ownership and enterprise performance,especially the second type of agency costs affected by changes in managerial ownership.Through research,it has been found that adjusting the management shareholding ratio can help shareholders better control the investment decisions of the enterprise,reduce management agency fees,and ensure the interests of small and medium-sized shareholders,thereby greatly improving the effectiveness of equity incentives.