The Influence Of Institutional Investor's Stock Ownership On Performance Of Listed Companies

Institutional investors was born in England and then became popular in America.At present,institutional investors have become the mainstream in the capital market of western developed countries.The active participation in corporate governance of institutional investors has been proved by many foreign scholars.Active participation in corporate governance has become the choice of most foreign institutional investors.Institutional investors develop relatively lately in China.In recent years,the government and other relevant departments have loosened the investment restrictions on securities investment funds,insurance,social security,pension funds,QFII and other types of institutional investors gradually,and then the scale of institutional investors'holdings has been increased quickly.At present,institutional investors have become an important force that can't be ignored in China's capital market.Because institutional investors have different internal interest relations,investment restrictions and profit requirements,there are difference in whether they can participate in corporate governance and how they can influence corporate performance.In terms of this consideration,we divide them into independent institutional investors and un-independent institutional investors according to whether the institutional investors have business transactions in their listed company,the source of funding and whether they can decide which corporate to invest.We study the effect of institutional investors on corporate performance in this way.At the same time this article study from two kinds of agency problems to further explore the path of the institutional investors affect the corporate peorder rformance,using a mediation effect model.In addition,considering the nature of different enterprises in China's capital market,this paper divides the whole sample companies into two different groups-state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises,in to study the differences in the two different groups.After the further study,we can take same measures to make institutional investors play more important role in corporate governance.The data of 1110 listed companies from 2008 to 2017 after the reform of non-tradable shares is used to conduct our study.In the whole article we use the panel fixed effect model in empirical analysis.At the same time,in order to avoid the endogenous problem of the model,this paper chooses the institutional investors data with lag of one period as the explanatory variable.After a series of theoretical analysis and empirical research,we draw the following conclusions.(1)There is a significant positive correlation between the overall shareholding of institutional investors and corporate performance,and so is the independent institutional investors.But there is no significant cor:relation between the shareholding of un-independent institutional investors and corporate performance.Considering the nature of enterprises,this correlation is more significant in non-state-owned enterprises.(2)There is a significant negative correlation between the total shareholding of institutional investors and the two types of agency costs,so is the independent institutional investors.But the un-independent investors can't play effect on the two types of agency.Considering the nature of enterprises,this correlation is more significant in non-state-owned enterprises.(3)Two kinds of agency costs play a mediating role on the influence between the overall institutional investors shareholding and corporate performance.Considering the nature of enterprises,the intermediary effect of the two types of agency costs is more strongly explained in non-state-owned enterprises.