Research On Closed-loop Supply Chain Pricing Decision-making Considering CSR Investment And Government Subsidies Under Risk Aversion

In recent years,with the speed of renewal of various electronic products,the number of obsolete and discarded products is increasing,which brings a great challenge to environmental protection.Companies will actively fulfill their corporate social responsibility to build a good image to improve their competitiveness.At the same time,the government,as the regulator and guide of the market,will also make incentive policies to improve the motivation of each enterprise to fulfill its social responsibility,thus promoting sustainable social development.Therefore,based on the realistic need for environmental protection,governments and enterprises are applying closed-loop supply chain management to their production activities.In addition,the unstable market environment and the increasingly fierce competition among enterprises make them more sensitive to risk aversion,and their risk aversion behaviors have impact on decision-making.Based on the above background,this paper puts the research perspective on the exploration of the closed-loop supply chain decision problem considering different members with risk aversion behaviors.Six closed-loop supply chain decision models based on no CSR investment,manufacturer’s CSR investment,and government’s CSR subsidy under manufacturer’s risk aversion and retailer’s risk aversion are constructed,and two closed-loop supply chain decision models based on manufacturer’s recycling model and retailer’s recycling model under the risk aversion of all supply chain members are also constructed.The effects of risk aversion coefficients,CSR investment of enterprises,and CSR subsidy policies of the government on manufacturers’ and retailers’ decision-making and supply chain benefits are investigated,and the selection of different recycling channels is also explored,and numerical simulations of the research results are conducted.The main research findings are as follows.(1)Manufacturers’ CSR investment facilitates retailers’ recycling of used products.which protects the environment and also improves the economic benefits of manufacturers and retailers-but for consumers,they have to bear the consequences of higher prices.At the same time,the manufacturer’s CSR investment amplifies the additional benefits and reduces the additional losses caused by the risk aversion of supply chain members.(2)The government’s CSR subsidy not only reduces retail prices,which helps compensate for the losses caused by consumers paying for CSR investment but also provides incentives for manufacturers to fulfill their corporate social responsibility,which is beneficial to both members and the entire supply chain.Moreover,government subsidies for manufacturers to invest in CSR can,to a certain extent,make the profits of one member of the supply chain more profitable due to the risk aversion behavior of another member,but also make the profits of supply chain members more profitable due to their risk aversion behavior.Therefore,the government should intervene reasonably in the actual situation.(3)Compared with only retailers with risk aversion behavior,the three models with only manufacturers with risk aversion behavior have higher recovery rates and lower CSR investment levels.Therefore,from the perspective of increasing the recovery rate,the models with the risk aversion behavior of manufacturers are more effective;from the perspective of increasing the CSR investment level,the models with the risk aversion behavior of retailers are more effective.(4)When studying the choice of recycling model,the structure of retailer recycling model is better from the perspective of improving the stability of CSR investment;from the perspective of improving the recycling rate,the recycling channel can be reasonably selected based on the comparison of the difference between the risk aversion coefficients of manufacturers and retailers and the critical value.As a regulator,the government also needs to set a reasonable amount of CSR subsidies based on the difference between the risk aversion coefficients of manufacturers and retailers to ensure that the current recycling model is reasonable and the profits of each member are balanced.