Research On Incentive Mechanism Of Professional Managers In Enterprises With Mixed Ownership Reform

As the most far-reaching economic component of socialism with Chinese characteristics,state-owned enterprises are the political pillar and economic context of the party’s ruling and rejuvenating the country.In the process of deepening the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises and the management of professional managers,it also includes the further study of the key theory of principal-agent.The reform of state-owned enterprises in China is developing in a gradual way.At the same time,professional managers are facing a multi-level principal-agent relationship different from those in foreign countries.Affected by these two attributes,China’s professional manager market is still far from perfect.At the same time,some professional managers after marketization still have the dual identity of politics and economy.How to motivate them should also be carefully considered.Under the background of deepening the reform of mixed ownership in state-owned enterprises,it is of great theoretical value and practical significance to explore the incentive mechanism for professional managers in mixed ownership reform and establish a modern enterprise system.Through the interpretation of policies related to the reform of mixed ownership enterprises,the analysis of the characteristics of professional managers and the investigation of the implementation of various systems,it is found that in the process of management and incentive of professional managers in mixed ownership reform enterprises at this stage,there are still some problems,such as enterprises’ emphasis on selection rather than management,inaccurate positioning,incomplete identity transformation of professional managers,passive salary management and insufficient medium and long-term incentives.In order to put forward optimization suggestions for the incentive mechanism of professional managers suitable for the reform of mixed ownership in China,this paper puts forward a theoretical framework for the incentive of professional managers in the reform of mixed ownership based on the three basic theories of human nature assumption,leadership role and demand level in management theory.This framework takes economic incentives,spiritual incentives and institutional constraints as the main incentive directions to build an incentive mechanism for professional managers in mixed ownership reform enterprises.On the basis of this framework,this paper uses the method of quantitative analysis to verify the impact of the existing economic incentive and spiritual incentive models of professional managers in the framework on the performance of enterprises.Based on the theoretical framework and quantitative analysis of the incentive mechanism for professional managers with mixed ownership,this paper puts forward systematic suggestions and corresponding optimization and improvement measures for the improvement of the incentive mechanism for professional managers,and puts forward some suggestions from multiple perspectives,such as optimizing the equity incentive mode,building a strong correlation performance incentive system,establishing a diversified and personalized spiritual incentive mode,and improving the multi-level constraint mechanism.Hope to provide valuable reference for the construction and innovation of professional managers’ incentive mechanism and the corresponding security system in the mixed ownership reform enterprises.