| Backdoor listing,as a relatively convenient way of listing,is favored by a large number of enterprises in urgent need of listing and expansion because of its low requirements and fast speed in capital and time.According to relevant regulations,the relevant rights and interests of the party with asymmetric information need to be protected during backdoor listing,and corresponding performance commitment clauses must be signed.These terms played a positive role in the initial time,safeguarded the rights and interests of relevant objects and improved the efficiency of listing.However,with the widespread use of performance commitments,many companies deliberately sign commitments that exceed the company’s normal operating capacity in order to improve the company’s valuation and raise the stock price after listing.For the purpose of avoiding high cash and share compensation and maintaining the stability of the company’s share price,these companies will use their own knowledge of more enterprise operations and non-public information to adjust the relevant data in the company’s financial statements and complete the performance commitments.This way of accurately realizing performance commitments will raise the stock price in the short term,but it will cause a lot of negative effects and shake the market order in the long term.Today,when the central government emphasizes making progress in economic work while maintaining stability,it is of great significance.This paper mainly studies the whole process of earnings management during the performance commitment period after the backdoor listed companies sign the performance commitment.The first part combs the relevant literature to clarify the generation and specific role of performance commitment,the definition,motivation,means,test methods and economic consequences of earnings management;The second part defines the performance commitment agreement and the concept of earnings management discussed in this paper,and introduces the theory of the signing motivation of performance commitment and the analysis of earnings management;The third part introduces the specific situation of both sides of backdoor listed companies and the whole process of backdoor listing.At the same time,it analyzes the background of backdoor listing,the motivation and existing problems of signing performance commitment agreement;The fourth part is the earnings management analysis of You Bo Pharmaceutical Co.,Ltd.during the performance commitment period.Firstly,it explores the motivation of earnings management,which are the operating difficulties brought by policy changes,avoiding the attention of regulators,stabilizing the stock market value,increasing the stock price and avoiding default compensation.Secondly,the modified Jones model and real earnings management model are used to quantify the degree of corporate earnings management.Finally,it analyzes the economic consequences of earnings management from the perspective of the company’s own financial performance and short-term and long-term;The fifth part puts forward suggestions on how to prevent the phenomenon of earnings management in performance commitment from the perspective of optimizing performance commitment agreement,reasonably pricing assets,strengthening the disclosure of performance commitment information and giving full play to the role of third-party institutions.Finally,the conclusions are drawn. |
