| The important policies that targeted poverty alleviation and rural vitalization strategy have been implemented in recent years,which lead to the improvement of farmers’ income through various emerging technologies and commercial modes.With the “Internet+” project’s rapid development,rural e-commerce is becoming an important role in carrying out poverty alleviation and rural vitalization.The technology of mobile terminals is becoming mature,which led China to enter the mobile Internet era,and the development of the consumption system has been profoundly influenced by e-commerce in deep.As an emerging economic entity,e-commerce is actively undertaking corporate social responsibility during the time of rapid development by going to the countryside to purchase agricultural products to aid the poor.The stability and diversity of the sales channels of agricultural products have been developed by ecommerce through purchasing the agricultural products of poor farmers,which causes remission of agricultural products’ stagnant sales.Thereby,one important characteristic that can distinguish poverty alleviation e-commerce from a normal company is corporate social responsibility,where the former’s objectives do not only concentrate on self-profit but also the maximization of farmers’ profits.More specifically,poverty alleviation e-commerce’s vital duty is to improve farmers’ income with the motivation to drive farmers out of poverty and then get rich,which makes e-commerce gradually become the key role of poverty alleviation.Facing poverty alleviation e-commerce,different cooperation modes to cooperate with the e-commerce can be chosen by farmers,namely,“e-commerce + farmers” and “e-commerce + cooperative + farmers”.This observation raises the curiosity about what the best mode of farmers is.Therefore,a game model of poverty alleviation supply chain considering the e-commerce’s social responsibility and the cooperative’s cost of management is developed to analyze the operational mechanisms of these two different modes,and finally identify the market conditions for the farmers to choose the optimal mode.In addition,e-commerce is disturbed by some troubles such as separated places of production in rural areas,high channel costs,and difficulty in forming the effect of scale concentration in the process of poverty alleviation,which leads to a low incentive for poverty alleviation objectively.Meanwhile,the shortage of capital is e-commerce’s pain point,which reduces the motivation for poverty alleviation.For solving these problems,the government provides subsidy for e-commerce,which will influence the e-commerce’s behavioral decisions and generate an effect on farmers’ choice of cooperation mode.Inspired by the observation above,a game framework is established to develop a model of three-echelon agricultural supply chain consisting of government,e-commerce,and farmers or cooperatives,analyzing the impact of government subsidy on the operational mechanisms of different modes,and finally presenting useful managerial insights for farmers and e-commerce to choose different modes on the different market conditions.This study finds out the following results:(1)Without government subsidy,when farmers establish a cooperative,the plant sizes will be expanded effectively.The low the cooperative’s cost of management or the higher degree of risk-averse of farmers,the stronger willingness for farmers to choose the “e-commerce + cooperative + farmers” mode.Only when the e-commerce’s degree of social responsibility is weak,farmers and the e-commerce will have the same preference for the mode.More specifically,when the cooperative’s cost of management is relatively low(high),both farmers and the e-commerce will prefer the “e-commerce+ cooperative + farmers” mode(the “e-commerce + farmers” mode).When the ecommerce’s degree of social responsibility is strong,farmers and the e-commerce will not have the same preference for the mode.(2)With government subsidy,farmers’ plant sizes in the two different cooperation modes are equal.Farmers’ preference for different modes is the same as the scenario without government subsidy.The low the cooperative’s cost of management or the higher degree of risk-averse of farmers,the stronger willingness for farmers to choose the “e-commerce + cooperative + farmers” mode.As for e-commerce,the “e-commerce+ farmers” mode will always be preferred with government subsidy.When ecommerce’s degree of social responsibility is weak,there is a win-win outcome for both parties in the “e-commerce + farmers” mode,and social welfare reaches a higher level.(3)Taking two subsidy scenarios into comparison,this research finds that the plant sizes will be expanded effectively with government subsidy.Furthermore,farmers show more preference for the “e-commerce + farmers” mode with government subsidy.Farmers and e-commerce can only achieve a win-win outcome under the “e-commerce+ farmers” mode.This study not only contributes to the enrichment of emerging e-commerce poverty alleviation literature but also leads to new managerial insights in relation to the selection of the optimal mode for the development of e-commerce poverty alleviation. |
