Research On Decision-making Of Power Battery Closed-loop Supply Chain Under Green Technology Innovation

The number of power batteries retired every year in my country has doubled with the vigorous development of the new energy vehicle industry.However,my country’s waste power battery recycling system is not perfect.If large number of waste power batteries are not treated in a standardized way,it will cause harm to the environment and the human body.It will undoubtedly make the recovery and reuse of the later retired power battery more convenient and intensive,and the classification and disposal will be more professional and safer if the green technology innovation design is carried out on the power battery in the early stage of production.From this perspective,we construct a power battery closed-loop supply chain decision-making model composed of power battery manufacturers,automakers and collectors.this thesis firstly explores the impact of decision-makers’ risk-averse behaviors on the decision-making of power battery closed-loop supply chain member under green technology innovation,and determines the decision-makers’ attitude towards risk by comparing and analyzing the game models of different decision-makers with risk aversion behavior.On this basis,we consider the impact of information sharing behavior of the automaker on the decision-making of power battery closed-loop supply chain members under green technology innovation,and further consider the impact of battery manufacturers’ fair concern behavior under different circumstances on the investment degree of green technology innovation,enterprise utility/expected profit and consumer surplus.Finally,we consider the coordination effect of government subsidies on the fairness concern behavior of battery manufacturers and the information sharing behavior of automakers,and the government’s optimal subsidy strategy is obtained.The main conclusions of this study are as follows:(ⅰ)The risk aversion behavior of the battery manufacturer and the collector reduce the investment in green technology innovation of power batteries,and reduce their utility to increase the utility of other members of the power battery closed-loop supply chain.The risk aversion of the battery manufacturer is beneficial to improve the collecting rate of used power batteries,the utility of automakers,the utility of collectors,and the consumer surplus,but it reduces its utility.The increased risk aversion of the collector increases the wholesale price of power batteries and the retail price of new energy vehicles,while the recycling rate of used power batteries,the utility of battery manufacturers,and the utility of automakers decrease.Therefore,it is necessary to avoid risk-averse behaviors by battery manufacturers and collectors from the perspective of increasing the level of investment in green technology innovation and the recycling rate of used power batteries.(ⅱ)The degree of investment in green technology innovation,the recycling rate of used power batteries,and the expected profit of collectors are the largest when information is shared with battery manufacturers and collectors.The behavior of information sharing always increases the expected profit of battery manufacturers,but reduces the expected profit of automakers and consumer surplus.Compared with the case where the information is shared only with the battery manufacturer,the automaker expects less reduction in profit and consumer surplus in the case where the information is shared with both the battery manufacturer and the collector.When automakers are optimistic about market demand forecasts,the wholesale price of power batteries,the level of investment in green technology innovation,and the retail price increase with the improvement of information prediction accuracy.The recycling rate increases with the improvement of information prediction accuracy under the condition that information is shared with both battery manufacturers and collectors.For automakers,there is no incentive to actively share the private information they have.(ⅲ)The fairness concerns behavior of battery manufacturers reduces the degree of investment in green technology innovation,the recycling rate of waste power batteries,and the expected profit of collectors,while the information sharing of automakers increase the degree of investment in green technology innovation,the recovery rate,and the expected profit of collectors.When the fairness concerns are small,the information sharing behavior offsets the impact of the fairness concern behavior of the investment in green technology innovation,the recycling rate of used power batteries,and the expected profit of collectors,and vice versa.The degree of investment in green technology innovation,the recycling rate of used power batteries,the expected profits of collectors and manufacturers,and consumer surplus decrease with fairness concerns.The fairness concern behavior of battery manufacturers further reduces the expected profit of automakers and consumer surplus,and the impact of fairness concern behavior on automakers’ profits is greater than the impact of information sharing on their profits.(ⅳ)Government subsidies can make up for the loss of battery manufacturers’ fairness concerns and automakers’ information sharing to automakers’ expected profits and consumer surplus.When the government subsidy is greater than a certain threshold,it is optimal for the government to select subsidized collectors.At this time,in the case of government-subsidized collectors,the level of investment in green technology innovation,the recycling rate of used power batteries,the expected profits of automakers and collectors,and consumers’ maximum remaining,the utility of battery manufacturers is also greater than without government subsidies.The paper has 31 pictures,2 tables,and 104 references.