Study On Pricing Strategies And Coordination In Closed-Loop Supply Chain With Fairness Concerns,Risk Aversion Consideration

The rapid development of the world economy has created a better life for people,but the negative impacts have followed.Serious resource depletion and environmental pollution are undoubtedly not reminding people of the importance of protecting the environment and sustainable development.In real life,people hope to save resources and protect the environment,while on the other hand,they hope to create revenue.Therefore,closed-loop supply chain management has become a hot issue in academic circles and enterprises.Since closed-loop supply chain management can achieve sustainable development,and there are huge benefits brought by recycling of waste products,more and more enterprises have begun to attach importance to closed-loop supply chain management,which is listed as an important part of their daily operations.Behavioral science shows that in real life,decision-makers often have certain behavioral tendencies when making decisions,and most supply chain members have a preference for fairness and risk aversion.Since multiple decision makers are involved in making decisions in a closed-loop supply chain,if the behavioral preferences of each member are not taken into account,it is highly likely that the overall decision of the closed-loop supply chain will deviate.Therefore,the research in this paper selects the two most common behavioral preferences in the decision-making body—fair concern and risk aversion behavior,and combines pricing game,contract coordination and behavioral preference to guide the decision-making members in the supply chain to make the most in the real environment.Excellent decision-making,while supplementing and perfecting the research on closed-loop supply chain theory,has theoretical and practical significance.The main research contents are as follows:Firstly,consider the situation in which decision makers have fair concerns(Chapter 3).Establish a utility function with the NASH bargaining fairness concern theory and construct two pricing game models that only retailers have fair concerns and retailers and manufacturers have fair concerns.Through the solution of the model,the influence of fair concern behavior on the optimal pricing strategy of supply chain members is further explored,and the income-cost sharing contract is designed to make the supply chain as a whole coordinated.Finally,the conclusions are verified by numerical simulation.Secondly,it studies the situation that decision makers have risk aversion behaviors(Chapter 4).Using the mean-variance theory to establish a utility function with risk aversion behavior factors and constructing only retailers with risk aversion behaviors and retailers,the manufacturer also has two pricing game models of risk aversion behavior.Through the solution of the model,the influence of risk aversion behavior on the optimal pricing strategy of supply chain members is further discussed,and the revenue sharing contract is designed to coordinate the supply chain.The conclusions were verified by numerical simulation.Finally,the optimal decision is made when considering the decision-making body with two behavioral preferences.This paper chooses the situation that the manufacturer has the risk aversion behavior and the retailer evades the risk and pays attention to the relative fairness(Chapter 5).The NASH bargaining fairness concern theory and the mean-variance theory are combined to establish a framework of fairness concern and risk aversion utility functions and model analysis.Further explore the impact of the joint effect of fairness and risk aversion on the optimal pricing strategy of supply chain members,and design a revenue-cost sharing contract to coordinate the supply chain as a whole.Finally,the conclusions are verified by numerical simulation.