| Dual-class share structure can solve the contradiction between equity financing and control dilution and avoid the adverse interference of external capital,which is favored by emerging Internet technology companies.The introduction of this system is conducive to improving the tolerance of China’s capital market and enhancing market vitality.However,the dual-class share structure provides space for the founding shareholders to infringe the interests of small and medium investors,causing market concerns and doubts,and investors also have a lot of doubts about it,and the investment intention is not high.Therefore,the primary problem is to solve the dilemma of protecting the interests of investors.On the basis of reviewing literature,this paper first expounds the supporting theory of the internal control strengthening mechanism,puts forward the basis,core and difficulty of the protection of the interests of small and medium investors,and expounds the influence mechanism of dual-class share structure on the interests of small and medium investors from the aspects of corporate value and shareholder behavior.Secondly,in view of jd’s early listing in the United States,complete information disclosure and typical dual-class share structure setting,this paper takes JD as the case study object and adopts comparative analysis method to analyze the impact of JD’s dual-class share structure on the interests of small and medium investors from two aspects of value impact and embezzlement effect.And analyzes the problems and the reasons behind the protection of investors’ interests.Jingdong’s voting rights ratio of up to 20 times has brought about the "founder effect",which is specifically manifested as excessive persistence in long-term strategy,unreasonable value distribution,increased investment risks for investors,and hidden dangers for the protection of interests of small and medium investors,which verifies relevant theoretical analysis.Finally,countermeasures and suggestions are put forward to help the localized development of dual-class share structure from the following three aspects: pre-voting right setting,information disclosure during the event and litigation protection after the event. |
