| The development of enterprises cannot be separated from the support of capital.With the continuous increase of enterprise scale,financing needs are indispensable.In recent years,with the dual-class share structure adopted by baidu,alibaba,jingdong and other companies to go public overseas,the dual-class share structure has come into public view.The dual-class share structure is different from the same share and same right structure.The former not only retains the control right of the founder and the management,but also solves the financing needs of the enterprise.The application of dual-class share structure increases the degree of separation between control right and cash flow right,aggravates the agency conflict between controlling shareholders,small and medium shareholders and external investors,increases agency cost,weakens the supervisory role of shareholders,and then causes earnings management behavior.Therefore,this paper focuses on the impact of dual-class share structure on earnings management through comparative analysis.Firstly,this paper sorts out the research status at home and abroad,and puts forward research hypotheses on the basis of relevant theoretical support.Secondly,taking Chinese companies listed in the United States as the research object,the management voting right ratio and equity balance degree are selected to measure the characteristics of equity structure,the modified Jones model is adopted to measure the degree of earnings management,using OLS regression analysis,through compared with the same stock right structure,empirically dual ownership structure’s impact on earnings management.The research results show that the proportion of voting rights of management is positively correlated with earnings management,and under the dual-class share structure,the role of management is more obvious because it holds shares with high voting rights.Under one share-one vote principle,the degree of balance of ownership is negatively correlated with earnings management,but under the dual-class share structure,the degree of balance cannot restrain earnings management due to the increasing separation of control power and cash flow right.Finally,based on the research results and the characteristics of the dual-class share structure and the supervisory utility,suggestions are put forward to reduce the earnings management behavior. |
