Mixed Ownership,executive Incentives And Total Factor Productivity

China is steadily advancing the reform of mixed ownership.The change of ownership structure brought by the reform affects the internal governance mode and production and operation decision-making behavior of enterprises.The reform of mixed ownership centered on share structure is conducive to the improvement of enterprise performance.At present,China’s economic development has entered the new normal mode,and enterprises are more pursuing high-quality development rather than high-speed development.As for the effect of mixed-ownership reform,a more comprehensive indicator--total factor productivity should be selected to measure it.The production efficiency level of enterprises has always been the direct concern of micro subjects.The ownership structure of mixed ownership will influence enterprise subjects from various aspects of management and production to make them allocate resources rationally and improve the governance structure of executive incentives,thus directly or indirectly affecting productivity.Based on productivity and economic growth theory,principal-agent theory,property rights theory and incentive theory,this thesis conducts research on mixed ownership,executive incentive and total factor productivity,combs historical documents related to this study,and conducts empirical analysis by taking A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2010 to 2020 as samples.Mixed ownership and enterprise research the relationship between the total factor productivity as well as the role of executive incentive in the mechanism,based on the enterprise industry attributes of different sample enterprises this thesis further be divided into competitive industries,non-competitive industries,enterprise industry attributes,management decision-making and the production efficiency will also be there exist certain differences,Group regression was used to explore the differences and their causes,and robustness test was carried out to ensure the reliability of the conclusions.Based on the above analysis,conclusions and policy recommendations were drawn.Finally,deficiencies of the study were found and future research prospects were made.In this thesis,the study found that the mixed ownership reform can promote enterprise total factor productivity,executive incentive plays an intermediary conduction role in which the different nature of shareholders to participate in the process of diversified ownership structure of mixed ownership reform,the influence on the enterprise executive incentive policy,will affect the total factor productivity of the enterprise.The results of the sector-specific study show that mixed ownership has a more significant impact on total factor productivity in competitive industries,while the mediating effect of management incentives only exists in competitive industries.The main contribution of this thesis lies in the following two points:(1)in the past to explore how mixed ownership reform affect corporate profitability or is the company’s performance is used to measure the return on assets and equity yield more,is not in conformity with the stable quality and continuous development of China’s current economic situation,this article take more comprehensive measure of economic growth and the production efficiency of enterprises total factor productivity as measure index.(2)In the past,most scholars only discussed the effect of a single executive incentive method on performance.In this thesis,both equity incentive and compensation incentive are included in the study to make a comparative analysis on the mechanism of their effect on mixed ownership and total factor productivity of enterprises.