Penalty Announcements And Voluntary Information Disclosure

With the increasingly maturity and improvement of China’s capital market,the single compulsory information disclosure of listed companies has in the past been unable to meet the diversified information needs of investors.As a supplement to compulsory information disclosure,voluntary information disclosure has been widely adopted by listed companies.Company voluntary information disclosure is mainly affected by the market and regulators two forces,this article from the perspective of government supervision,discusses the relationship between administrative penalty announcement and voluntary information disclosure,testing the actual effect of legal supervision at the same time for the further construction and improvement of information disclosure system provides reference.The research objects of this article are all A-share listed companies in China from 2003-2020.Using the methods of comparative analysis,literature research,normative research and empirical research,through a review of the literature on the influencing factors of voluntary information disclosure,the effect of violation penalties,and the research on the relationship between the two,and after sorting out the development of the voluntary information disclosure system,the research framework of voluntary information disclosure is constructed based on the entrusted agency theory,signal transmission theory and legitimacy theory.This paper first discusses whether the company that receives the illegal punishment announcement is more willing to make voluntary information disclosure.Secondly,it further studies the relationship between government supervision and the quality of voluntary information disclosure from the two aspects of the illegal punishment announcement and the amount of punishment.After descriptive statistical analysis,regression analysis,robustness tests with substitution variables and PSM’s stationarity test,the study hypothesis the research have been verified.Through further analysis,including group test and influence mechanism analysis,the conclusion of this article is further discussed.The empirical results show a positive relationship with the probability of voluntary disclosure;illegal penalty has a positive effect on high-quality voluntary disclosure;the greater the punishment,the higher the listed company is to improve the quality of voluntary disclosure;group inspection shows that the voluntary disclosure is preferred;mechanism inspection shows that mandatory illegal supervision is conducted by affecting the media attention and investor attention of the listed company.With the improvement of information disclosure regulations,the company’s voluntary disclosure level has also been improved,which shows that China’s information disclosure control is effective in recent years.This efficiency may be because China’s capital market is an emerging market with the low overall level of information disclosure.The idea to strengthen information disclosure and promote voluntary market disclosure through information disclosure control is appropriate.According to the above conclusions,the following suggestions are proposed: encourage and protect enterprises to conduct voluntary accounting disclosure to promote market innovation and competition;government regulators should strengthen the improvement of voluntary information disclosure system and implement reward and punishment measures;establish an audit mechanism and supervision mechanism for voluntary accounting disclosure;standardize the operating system of information consulting agencies and investment agencies.The conclusions of this paper give stakeholders a clearer understanding of the current situation of corporate voluntary disclosure,make the government more clear about the effectiveness of its regulatory penalties,and expand the research perspective of voluntary disclosure.