An Empirical Study On The Effect Of A-share And H-shareCross-Listing Upon Voluntary Information Disclosure

On the basis of constructing a voluntary disclosure index (VDI) to measure the voluntary disclosure level of listed companies, this paper empirically studies the effects of A‐share and H‐share cross‐listing on voluntary disclosure by using the OLS regression model. The empirical evidences indicate that the voluntary disclosure level of China’s listed companies have a significant positive correlation with A‐share and H‐share cross‐listing, suggesting that A‐share and H‐share cross‐listing can contribute to improve the voluntary disclosure level. In addition, the voluntary disclosure level is significantly positive correlated with the company size and significantly negative correlated with the asset‐liability ratio.Further, this paper explores the impact of A‐share and H‐share cross‐listing on the voluntary disclosure level of financial information, non‐financial information and predicting information respectively. The research results are as follows: Firstly, A‐share and H‐share cross‐listing can contribute to improve the voluntary disclosure level of financial information, and the voluntary disclosure of financial information level is significantly positive correlated with the ownership concentration and significantly negative correlated with the asset‐liability ratio. Secondly, A‐share and H‐share cross‐listing can also contribute to improve the voluntary disclosure level of non‐financial information, and the voluntary disclosure of non‐financial information level is significantly positive correlated with the company size and the independent director proportion, and significantly negative correlated with the asset‐liability ratio. Thirdly, A‐share and H‐share cross‐listing does not show a significant impact on the voluntary disclosure of predicting information, while the company size is significantly positive correlated with the voluntary disclosure of predicting information and the unity of the two roles of chairman and general manager can inhibit the company disclose predicting information voluntarily.