| The large-scale operation of agricultural land circulation is the inevitable choice for the development of traditional agriculture to modernization,and the only way for agricultural modernization.Under the background of the continuous opening of the central policy,China’s agricultural land circulation is still facing practical difficulties,and agricultural operation is facing huge risks.Various reasons lead to the difficulty in improving the marketization level of rural land circulation,and the interests of all parties are not guaranteed.On the basis of the gradual expansion of land circulation area and the continuous improvement of trust law and farmland circulation market,farmland trust has become a possibility of innovation of farmland circulation mode,which provides a new idea for promoting land scale management and traditional agricultural transformation.With the deepening of China’s rural land system reform,the transfer of rural land trust has also been further developed.Some areas can adjust in time when they are hindered by the law and system,and make flexible response.They have made positive attempts to improve the land trust system,but at the same time,some areas are also unable to move,and the development is stagnant.How to make a scientific comparative analysis of different development scenarios of rural land trust constitutes the starting point of this paper.In reality,rural land trust is the result of game and compromise among multiple stakeholders,involving multiple stakeholders.The combination of trust and rural land circulation provides a new idea for the innovation and development of rural land circulation system.Under the trust contract,the behavior of each interest subject will affect the process of rural land trust,and the process of rural land trust is also a game interaction process in which each participant pursues the maximization of their own interests under the existing system conditions.Based on this,this paper takes Suzhou and Dengzhou rural land trust as typical cases,summarizes the development status of rural land trust,establishes evolutionary game models based on the reality of the two places,analyzes the game process between the participants in rural land trust,and analyzes the participants,trust behavior and trust effect of land trust based on transaction cost theory and evolutionary game theory On this basis,this paper studies the development status and problems of land trust under different modes;on the basis of game analysis of the existing problems of China’s rural land trust,combined with numerical simulation,it further points out the important factors affecting the decisionmaking behavior of rural land trust participants.The main conclusions of this paper are:there are a lot of transaction costs in the process of game,the risk of agricultural operation is too large,the net income of trust company,agricultural operation income,the early investment of agricultural project,the support of government to land trust have an important impact on the evolution direction of the system.The local governments of Suzhou and Dengzhou have different roles,participation degree and interest structure in the agricultural land trust,and their behaviors are significantly different.The intervention of local governments in the process of agricultural land trust in Dengzhou promotes the development of agricultural land trust in the direction of bilateral cooperation.Finally,we need to strengthen the guidance of rural land trust system,create a good policy environment,open up trust financing channels,innovate capital investment mechanism,strengthen trust risk management,establish strict supervision mechanism and other aspects to improve the supporting policies of rural land trust,optimize,standardize and coordinate the behavior of rural land trust participants,and promote the sustainable and orderly development of rural land trust. |
