Research On The Selection Of E-commerce Platform And Pricing Strategy Of Company B For Dual-channel Supply Chain

The development and application of the Internet and information technology have prompted e-commerce to change the traditional retail model.Many retail enterprises start to layout online channels while maintaining the traditional physical retail,thus forming the dual-channel distribution model.As a brand manufacturer,Company B has not established online channels before 2016.Since the establishment of direct-sale stores on Tmall platform in 2016,the company’s online business income was poor,accounting for less than 5%of the company’s revenue.In addition to individual consumers,Company B also has a large number of enterprise users and construction units among its target customers.Due to large single demand,these consumers can get lower prices through offline channels than online ones.In view of the above situation,how to choose the e-commerce platform to constitute dual-channel sales has become a problem to the company.Based on this,this thesis,starting from the actual situation of B Company,studies the selection and pricing of e-commerce platform under Company B’s dual-channel operation,analyzes the reasons that affect Company B’s dual-channel sales,and provides suggestions for Company B to choose an appropriate e-commerce platform.In this thesis,the potential market of products is divided into two market segments.Then the demand functions of manufacturers and retailers in the two market segments are constructed.Taking into account the effects of market segment size,offline channel market share,inter-channel competition degree and e-commerce platform commission coefficient,a Stackelberg game model of Company B entering B2B platform or B2C platform is established.By solving the game in reverse order,the optimal pricing strategy and profit of the manufacturer entering different e-commerce platforms are calculated.Finally,Mathematica software is used for model analysis and numerical calculation,and the optimal pricing and profit of the three modes of entry are compared.The impact of market size,market share,the degree of competition between channels and platform commission on pricing and profit are analyzed.The results show that:(1)The optimal online channel pricing of the manufacturer increases with the increase of the market share of the online channel in the market segment.The wholesale price of the manufacturer has the same trend as the retail price of the retailer,which will increase with the increase of the market share of the offline channel.(2)The optimal pricing of both parties will increase with the increasing degree of competition between manufacturers and retailers.When the manufacturer enters two e-commerce platforms and launches a comprehensive competition with the retailers,the competition degree of another market segment will also have an impact on the retail price of this market segment,but the impact is not as good as that of this market segment.(3)Manufacturers can obtain more profits than a single offline channel by establishing online channels,and the more e-commerce platforms they enter,the more profits they will gain under the premise of full competition with retailers.(4)The profit of manufacturers will increase with the increase of the market share of online channels,and the market segment with a larger market size will make a greater contribution to the profit of manufacturers.Finally,in view of the existing problems of Company B’s dual-channel supply chain operation,the corresponding countermeasures and suggestions are put forward.