With the rapid development of Internet technology,more and more consumers prefer online shopping.In such a crazy wave of online shopping,many manufacturers and B2 C retail platforms began to seek more online sales models,trying to connect consumers through the network to occupy a larger market.In the current e-commerce environment,some B2 C e-commerce platforms have changed the original single retail model and started to open the platform to businesses,expanding revenue through a self-operated and joint-venture business model.Under the open environment of B2 C e-retail platform,based on Stackelberg game theory,this paper first studies the selection of direct marketing channels for large manufacturers.Then,under the mixed mode of "self-management + joint venture" of B2 C e-commerce platform,considering the level of service,the optimal strategies of e-commerce platform and manufacturer in dual-channel supply chain are discussed and analyzed.The main contents and conclusions of this paper are as follows:Firstly,in view of the change of B2 C retailers’ gradually opening platform from single retail mode to mixed operation mode of attracting merchants to enter the platform for online direct marketing,manufacturers will face two kinds of problems in choosing online direct marketing channels: one is self-built network direct marketing channels;the other is renting network direct marketing channels of professional e-commerce platforms.Based on Stackelberg game theory,this paper establishes a network direct marketing channel selection model with a large manufacturer as the leader,and gives the conditions for manufacturer to choose different network direct marketing channels.The results show that the cost of building a self-built network sales platform,the increase of operating and management costs when leasing a professional e-commerce platform,and the ability of manufacturers to bargain for rent will affect their choice of network direct marketing channels.At the same time,the operating and management costs and bargaining ability will also affect the leasing intention of professional e-commerce platform.Secondly,in view of the open platform of B2 C,considering the level of service,using Stackelberg game theory and taking B2 C retailers as leaders,the paper establishes a two-channel optimal decision-making model consisting of network direct marketing channels and electronic retail channels,and gives the optimal solution.This paper analyses the influence of bargaining power of e-commerce platform and the proportion of platform Commission on the optimal pricing,sales and service decisions of both sides.The results show that the price of both parties is inversely proportional to the bargaining power of e-commerce platforms and directly proportional to the Commission ratio.Sales will change in the opposite direction with the change of variables,forming a complementary effect.The higher the bargaining power,the lower the wholesale price,and the higher the Commission ratio,the higher the wholesale price.The optimal service level varies with the range of variables.On the premise that both sides are profitable,the bargaining power of wholesale bargaining is not the bigger the better for the platform.E-commerce platforms should seek a balance between bargaining power and the commission rate charged to manufacturers.Platforms should be more open and better services to expand the number of third-party businesses and sales scale,and to collect third-party commissions as the main profit growth point.The research results can be used for reference for manufacturers to choose different direct marketing channels and the marketing strategy decision of manufacturers and e-commerce platforms under the mixed mode of "self-management + joint venture". |