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Research On The Tax Compliance Of Anchors Of Live Streaming Ecommerce From The Perspective Of Game Theory

Posted on:2024-04-12Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y ZhangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2568307067454764Subject:Tax
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
With the development of the digital economy,the live delivery industry has gradually entered our vision.The new shopping model of online selection and online consumption has won the favor of netizens because of its convenience.The live delivery industry under the COVID-19 epidemic has achieved unprecedented development.According to the 50 th "Statistical Report on the Development of Internet in China" released by the China Internet Network Information Center,as of June 2022,the total number of netizens in China was 1.051 billion,including 716 million live streaming users,841 million online shopping users,and 904 million online payment users.In July 2020,the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security released a new type of "live salesperson".All kinds of data and phenomena show the strong development trend of the live e-commerce industry,It plays a more and more important role in promoting employment and economic livelihood in China.However,with the vigorous development of the industry,the new format of digital economy has also put forward new issues for tax supervision.Attracted by the high income,more and more people are engaged in the live broadcast and goods industry,resulting in the increasingly serious problem of tax evasion and tax evasion by the anchors,causing adverse effects.In 2021,a large amount of tax evasion and tax evasion incidents involving multiple anchors with goods were exposed,which attracted national attention.The tax evasion and tax evasion of the anchor with goods has caused a large loss of financial revenue in China.The problem of tax compliance of the anchor with goods in China needs to be solved urgently.Moderately increase the penalties for tax evasion,reduce the inspection costs of tax authorities,improve the success rate of tax inspection,and apply big data technology and the willingness to report tax evasion in advance,which is conducive to improving the tax compliance of the host with goods.First of all,this study starts from the basic theory and based on the existing theory and literature,introduces the development of the live broadcasting industry and the status quo of tax collection and management,the business model and main income types of the live broadcasting anchor,as well as the problems in the tax collection and management of the live broadcasting industry.At the same time,through the game analysis of "taxpayer tax authority" and "taxpayer withholding agent",Explore the theoretical and practical factors that affect the tax compliance of the carrier broadcaster,and draw a conclusion that the carrier broadcaster can effectively improve the tax compliance by adjusting the penalty multiple,applying the big data collection and management technology,reducing the tax cost,improving the success rate of tax inspection,and introducing the reporting mechanism of willingness to evade tax in advance.Through the introduction of the case of the head anchor Viya’s tax evasion,this study analyzes the means of tax evasion such as the establishment of a personal studio and the abuse of local tax preferential policies,reveals the problems existing in China’s tax collection and management of the anchor with goods,and puts forward suggestions such as ensuring that the tax rate is fair and reasonable,clarifying the income tax items of the anchor,improving the withholding and payment system and the two-way reporting system,and establishing and improving the pre-and post-event double reporting system,With a view to improving the tax compliance of broadcasters with goods,improving the tax loss in China’s live broadcast and goods industry,deepening the tax reform during the "14th Five-Year Plan" period,and promoting the fairness of income distribution.
Keywords/Search Tags:Anchors of live streaming ecommerce, Tax compliance, Game Theory
PDF Full Text Request
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