Research On The Optimization Mechanism For Resource Utilization And Social Welfare In Device-to-Device Communication

Device-to-Device communication(D2D)allows devices to communicate directly by sharing adjacent resources,which can effectively optimize spectral efficiency.D2 D communication consists of base stations,the providers and the requesters.Most of the current work on D2 D communication does not consider the case where the provider is not involved in the communication.When sharing resources,providers will incur various costs such as energy consumption and time.Providers will not be willing to share resources for free without some compensation.The technical advantage of D2 D communication is low latency,and efficient communication requires device owners to continuously share resources.In order to ensure that resource requests can be responded quickly,the role of incentive providers cannot be ignored.In the current research on the incentive mechanism of D2 D communication,there are problems of low resource utilization and social welfare(that is,the expenditure saved by the platform and the requester),which in turn leads to low stability of the communication network.The reasons for these problems include:(1)The current incentive mechanism only incentivizes a single round.Every time there is a resource request,the platform or the requester needs to recruit providers,which aggravates the problem of resource utilization under the limited delay;(2)The current incentive method focuses on improving the reward.Increasing the compensation will increase the expenditure of the platform or the requester,resulting in a low level of social welfare,and it is difficult to ensure the continuous operation of the incentive mechanism.In general,neither of them considers the continuity of the incentive mechanism,resulting in a certain gap between the incentive effect and the requirements of D2 D communication.In order to solve the problem of low resource utilization and social welfare,this thesis introduces the path dependence theory in behavioral economics,uses the characteristics of reference effect and risk aversion,analyzes the process of path dependence,and designs an incentive mechanism based on path dependence.The reference effect proves that the decision is based on the relative value of the reference point and the reward.Risk aversion justifies the cost of changing the current choice is seen as a risk,and if you can’t gain more,you will continue with the current choice.(1)Aiming at the low resource utilization,a Cultivating Path Dependence Mechanism based on Reference Effect(CPDM-RE)was designed.The utility function is reconstructed by using the induced high price,and the reference effect coefficient and the utility conversion coefficient are proposed,so that the provider can participate in D2 D communication for many times.At the same time,whether the provider is dependent is judged by the dependency strength,thereby improving resource utilization.(2)When the provider generates path dependence,aiming at the problem of low social welfare,this thesis designs a Maintaining Path Dependence Mechanism based on Risk Aversion(MPDM-RA).Through the conversion cost,the risk aversion factor and dependency intensity decay rate are proposed,and the guarantee mechanism is effective for a long time by using the risk aversion characteristics.To sum up,the device holder is promoted to participate in D2 D communication,and the communication method or the requester is path dependent,so as to promote the provider to continuously share resources.Through experimental verification,the incentive mechanism of this thesis is within the cost budget of the platform and the requester,improving resource utilization and social welfare.