Optimization And Selection Of Government Carbon Quota Mechanism Driving Carbon Emission Reduction In Supply Chain Under Carbon Trading

In modern times,the industrial revolution has created huge productivity,promoted the high-quality development of production and life in various countries,and also brought severe challenges to the environment.The global warming caused by excess carbon dioxide emissions has attracted global attention,and the control of carbon emissions has become a strategic requirement of all countries.For the "carbon peaking and carbon neutrality" goals,China has formulated a corresponding action plan.Carbon cap-and-trade is one of the central policy tools to achieve this vision,and a carbon trading scheme starts with carbon quotas.At present,the carbon trading market is still in its infancy,and the allocation of quotas is mainly free of charge.If the carbon emissions of products are less than the quota,the surplus carbon emission rights can be traded through the carbon trading market for profit,otherwise,the carbon emission rights need to be purchased to meet production.So how much free carbon is it reasonable for the government to give? If there are too many carbon quotas,enterprises will rely on free allowances and reduce their initiative to reduce emissions.If the carbon quota is too small,enterprises will face greater pressure to reduce emissions,and the advantages of the carbon quota mechanism cannot be played.Therefore,it is of great significance to study how to design an effective and reasonable carbon quota mechanism.Firstly,the carbon quota mechanism based on output is designed and optimized.The government allocates free carbon quota according to the output of the manufacturers,and the more output of the manufacturers,the more total carbon quota they get.The optimal decision and profit of the manufacturer and retailer,the optimal decision of the government and the optimal social welfare are obtained by solving the model,and then the influence of relevant factors on the optimal parameters of the mechanism is analyzed.The results are as follows: first,the effectiveness of the mechanism is closely related to the initial carbon emissions and emission reduction cost coefficient of unit product.Only when the initial carbon emissions and emission reduction cost coefficient of unit product are in the same range,the carbon quota mechanism based on output is feasible.Second,the profits and social welfare of manufacturers and retailers are positively correlated with the low carbon cost coefficient.This is because enterprises have obtained more carbon quotas,and the emission reduction per unit product is reduced.At this time,the benefits of trading in the carbon trading market are greater than the emission reduction investment.Third,manufacturers need to pay more to the carbon trading market to purchase carbon emission rights in order to complete the emission reduction task.The increase of the carbon trading price will increase the purchase cost of enterprises,so the profit will be reduced.The cost of manufacturers will also be transferred to the downstream of the supply chain by raising the wholesale price and sales price,so the profit of retailers will also be reduced.Secondly,the carbon quota mechanism based on emission reduction technology is designed and optimized.The government allocates free carbon quota according to the level of emission reduction technology of manufacturers.The higher the emission reduction technology is,the more carbon quota the manufacturer will get,and the level of emission reduction technology is measured by the amount of emission reduction per unit product.The optimal decision of manufacturers and retailers,the optimal profit,the optimal decision of the government and the optimal social welfare are obtained by solving the model,and then the influence of relevant factors on the optimal parameters of the mechanism is analyzed.The results are as follows: first,the carbon quota mechanism based on emission reduction technology is feasible only when the initial carbon emission and emission reduction cost coefficient of unit product are within the common range.Second,the level of initial carbon emissions will affect the emission reduction effect of manufacturers.The government only allocates carbon quotas according to the emission reduction input of enterprises but ignores the actual emission reduction of products,and enterprises just blindly increase emission reduction input but ignore the increase of emission reduction cost.Third,the excessively high carbon trading price will encourage manufacturers to independently reduce emissions and reduce the carbon emissions of products.The surplus carbon quota can be traded to increase revenue,but it will also damage the interests of retailers and social welfare.Finally,the two carbon quota systems are analyzed and compared.First,the effective range of the two carbon quota mechanisms is analyzed,and the common feasible regions of the two carbon quota mechanisms are obtained.Then,the optimal profits and optimal decisions of the parties under the two carbon quota mechanisms are compared.The results are as follows: first,there is a common feasible area between the two mechanisms,in which the government can choose one or the other,and the carbon quota mechanism based on emission reduction technology can be applied to a significantly larger scope.Second,in the common effective interval of the two quota mechanisms,the government’s optimal social welfare,the manufacturer’s optimal profit and the retailer’s optimal profit under the output carbon quota mechanism are all higher than those under the carbon quota mechanism of emission reduction technology,so the government should choose the carbon quota mechanism based on output when faced with a choice.Third,in the common effective interval of the two quota mechanisms,the optimal unit product emission reduction and free total carbon quota under the carbon quota mechanism based on output are always higher than the optimal decision under the carbon quota mechanism based on emission reduction technology,while the optimal selling price and the optimal wholesale price are opposite.