Research On The Legal Issues Of Internal Governance Of State-controlled Enterprises In The Context Of Mixed Ownership Reform

The reform of mixed ownership is not a concept that has only been proposed in recent years.It is based on the practice of state-owned enterprise reform in the past.After the Third Plenary Session of the 18 th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China,a new round of mixed ownership reform with the important goal of establishing modern corporate governance mechanisms within state-owned enterprises has begun.As an important component of state-owned enterprises,state-owned holding enterprises have made significant contributions to China’s economic development and are also a typical form of mixed reform enterprises.They have important research value for promoting mixed reform and improving internal governance of state-owned enterprises.After the previous rounds of reforms,modern company management systems have been preliminarily established within state-owned holding enterprises,but there are still problems such as low efficiency and insufficient vitality.The fundamental reason why the reform effect has not been ideal is that it has not touched on the institutional mechanisms of corporate governance,which is also an important reason why current mixed capital reform countries emphasize promoting the "reform mechanism" through "mixed capital".This article first explains the relevant concepts and theories involved in the internal governance of state-owned mixed ownership enterprises,providing a theoretical basis for exploring the causes of internal governance issues and proposing suggestions for institutional improvement in the following text.Subsequently,specific cases from domestic mixed reform practices and judicial practices were selected for empirical analysis,and it was pointed out that there are problems in the internal governance of state-owned holding mixed reform enterprises,such as confusion between party organizations and corporate governance mechanisms,administrative intervention affecting shareholder cooperation,prominent internal control phenomena,insufficient supervision by supervisory boards,and serious corruption among executives.Subsequently,starting from the institutional level,we will explore the reasons for the above-mentioned governance issues in terms of the relationship between the Party committee and the corporate governance mechanism,the shareholders’ meeting,the board of directors,the supervisory board,and the senior management.With consideration for the arrangement of legal systems,the author also studied the beneficial explorations of several state-owned holding mixed reform enterprises with demonstration effects in optimizing internal governance,and summarized the successful experiences among them.Finally,based on empirical research and analysis,this article proposes targeted institutional construction suggestions for improving the internal governance issues of state-owned holding mixed reform enterprises,including improving the institutional guarantee for party organizations to participate in corporate governance,introducing strategic shareholders to construct a reasonable equity structure,optimizing the board of directors governance system,leveraging the legal supervision effectiveness of the supervisory board,and establishing a sound incentive and constraint mechanism for executives.