Antitrust Regulation Of Internet Platform Blocking Behavio

With the development of the Internet economy,the competition between platforms has become more and more fierce.In order to win user resources,Internet platforms continue to obtain platform traffic,and constantly implement various "banning" behaviors,which has aroused widespread attention from academia,judicial circles and ordinary people.However,due to the vague provisions on relevant acts in the Anti-Monopoly Law,some controversy has arisen in the academic circles over the regulation of platform bans.Taking this as a starting point,this paper provides useful suggestions for China’s anti-monopoly regulations to regulate such behaviors from the perspective of theory and practice through a comprehensive analysis of platform banning.This article mainly contains the following four parts:Part 1: Overview of the platform ban.Platform banning is the unique phenomenon of the platform’s ecological layout and competition in the context of competition homogeneity.The academic community has not yet formed a unified concept of its uniform.This article defines it from the platform’s ban on performance behavior,and defines its extension as two behaviors of direct chain and banned API.Under normal circumstances,the platform can freely choose the transaction object,and independently decide whether to ban a ban on the counterparty of the transaction.However,the platform-based quasi-public attributes,Internet interconnection attributes,and consumer sovereignty theory.The platform is not a purely private subject.When free competition and consumer interests,they should be regulated by law.Part 2: The nature of the platform banned behavior.This section analyzes the platform’s ban on the platform and believes that it meets the objective aspects of refusing trading in the Anti-Monopoly Law.Because the academic community’s rejection of the platform’s rejection of the transaction is controversial,there is controversy on the premise of the necessary facilities in the platform,which leads to different views on whether the platform’s ban constitutes the rejection of trading behavior.Therefore,the relationship between the theory of facilities and the rejection of transactions must be discussed in this part.Eventually,it is believed that the platform’s rejection of transaction is not based on the platform to meet the necessary facilities as the pre-elevation.The illegal ban on the right to the right can still be qualitatively qualified by rejecting the transaction.Part 3: The market domination status of the platform’s ban is determined.At present,the development of the Internet across competition has become the norm,and platform banning behaviors involve many market fields.Against this background,the design of platform benchmark products and related market definitions are more complicated.When defining the related market involved in the platform’s ban,the base needs of the banned person should be defined as the benchmark product as the starting point,combined with the characteristics of the platform’s ban and damage that occur in different markets,and define multiple related markets for the platform banning behavior.Secondly,when defining the dominance of the market,the reference value of user activity should be paid attention to,but it should also pay attention to the differences in the statistical methods that may exist in different platforms,which may affect the accuracy of the market forces.Standards.In addition,when identifying the market dominance of the platform,we should focus on its ability to control the market.Part 4: Analysis of the illegal composition of the platform ban.The premise of anti-monopoly regulation of platform ban is to be anti-competitiveness of the platform’s ban.This article takes the anti-competitiveness of the behavior as the entry point.Refining: In terms of objective behavior,the platform is required to have a competitive relationship between the subjects of the two parties,there are previous transactions,and the banker of the banned behavior is transaction.Rules,efficiency,information protection,etc.can be used as a reason for the defense of the ban on the banquet,but when the platform is treated differently when the platform rules are performed,the platform ban has the damage to the overall efficiency of the market competition than the maintenance income of its own efficiency,so as to use it in order to pay for its own efficiency.When information protection is deliberately interfered with data circulation,the legitimacy of the reasons for defense weakens.In addition,the proportion principle should consider the legitimate boundary of the platform’s ban.